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The overarching purpose of this dissertation is to provide the literature with a revised 
conceptualization of gender beliefs that will better explain variance in public opinion. 
When trying to operationalize feminist attitudes in the past, the public opinion 
literature has relied on measures of abortion or one-dimensional index scores- 
basically collapsing attitudes into a false dichotomy of feminist/antifeminist. This is 
problematic for many reasons. I argue that the feminist belief system should be 
treated as a multidimensional concept comprising at least three distinct dimensions: 
belief about women’s opportunity; belief about assertive women; and belief about the 
changing family structure and role of the mother. The second half of the dissertation 
applies this new approach within the areas of abortion attitudes, candidate evaluations 
(both experimental and real world), and party affiliation. Overall, the findings support 
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It's the Mommy Wars: Special Campaign Edition. But this time the battle 
lines are drawn inside out, with social conservatives, usually staunch 
advocates for  stay-at-home motherhood, mostly defending her [Palin], 
while some others, including plenty of working mothers, worry that she is 
taking on too much.  
(Kantor and Swarns, New York Times, 2008) 
 
The 2008 election, with the unprecedented performance of two national woman 
candidates, was a salient reminder to political scientists tha understanding gender role 
attitudes and their effect on political evaluations are important to contemporary politics. 
No longer are dichotomies such as feminist/antifeminist accurate in the study of public 
opinion; this categorization in contemporary politics “masks the complexity of … 
attitudes toward the women’s movement” (Buschman and Lenart 1996). While normative 
theorists and activists work to establish a blueprint for what feminism should mean in the 
abstract, this dissertation investigates how the American electorate understands and forms 
opinions about gender roles and equality and how those gender beliefs affect political 
choices. A better understanding of how the American electorate formsopinions dealing 
with the complex issue set falling under the umbrella of feminism will allow for a more 
accurate study of how such beliefs influence a range of political activity from candidate 




 The first part of this dissertation focuses on the conceptualization and 
measurement of gender beliefs. While previous public opinion scholarship examining 
gender opinion treats it as a one-dimensional belief, this project will show that, in fact, it 
is multidimensional. The contemporary American electorate embodies at least three 
different kinds of gender beliefs that, for some people, are unrelated.  I will establish the 
distinctiveness of three gender related predispositions and will also show that the factors 
that predict them are distinctive as well.   
 The first dimension deals with beliefs about women’s opportunities, the second 
dimension focuses on the evolving role of the mother and family structure and, finally, 
the third dimension focuses on beliefs about assertive women. The second half of this 
dissertation explores the relationship between gender beliefs and candidate evaluations, 
party affiliation, and abortion attitudes.  I rely on data from the 2008 American National 
Election Study (ANES), the Cumulative American National Election Study, and the 2010 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). 
I choose, and do so throughout the dissertation, to focus only on whites and 
remove African-Americans and Hispanics from the sample and analysis (with the 
exception of Chapter 5 due to concern for sample size, however, race is controlled for). 
Historically, African-Americans and Hispanics have had a different experience with civil 
rights and equality compared to whites. I suspect that this differentially interacts with 
their feminist belief system. The relationship between African-Americans and Hispanics 
to the thesis presented in this dissertation is important to the overall story of women in 
America and deserves investigation as well. Dedicating one chapter would not be 




fruitful topic that shall be addressed in future work stemming from the dissertation. For 
the sake of not sounding repetitive, when I refer to the electorate throughout the 
dissertation, I mean white Americans. 
 While the women’s movement has evolved over time, our scholarly understanding 
of the gender belief systems has lagged behind. In order to better understa  public views 
on women’s equality in the public and private spheres of life, it is essential to 
reinvestigate how Americans form and utilize gender values particulrly as they pertains 













































Only a day after reports went public that 2012 Presidential candidate Herman Cain had a 
history of sexual harassment allegations his fundraising soured, in fact, “his campaign 
collected 644 itemized donations — more than four times what it received on an average 
day” (Levinthal Politico February 1, 2012). This news is somewhat surprising given just 
four years earlier the American public embraced two national woman candidates from 
each side of the political aisle. This combination of events illuminates the complex 
relationship between the contemporary American public and feminism. On the one hand, 
a historic year for women in politics, on the other, a demonstration that suggests we have 
progressed little in our views toward sexual harassment since the Anita Hill hearings in 
1991.  Beyond the campaign trail, questions of women’s role in society, motherhood, 
gender and women’s advancement and sexual harassment, to name just a few, prove to be 
prevalent in everyday politics.  
In this chapter, I will present a snapshot of the contemporary American 
electorate’s feminist attitudes. Overall, the measures neither paint a picture of an 




in the past. Rather, we see that the electorate has developed a complex conception of 
women’s role in society. This comes as no surprise because the womn’s ovement and 
feminism have never experienced a clear, linear trajectory in regard to either progress or 
goals (although few social movements do). Unlike minority groups fightin  for equal 
rights, women’s personal lives are heavily intertwined with and interdependent with 
men’s. As shown in the following figures, this complex history and interdependence has 
contributed to a fragmentation of opinion about gender roles within the Amrican 
electorate. 
 There are seven measures on the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES) 
capturing attitudes dealing with a woman’s place in society, in addition to ratings of 
feminists as a social group, that are regularly used by political s ientists.1 ANES 
participants were read several statements and asked whether they agre d, disagreed, or 
neither agreed nor disagreed. The first statement reads: “It is much better for everyone 
involved if the man is the achiever and the woman takes care of thehom  and family.”2   
As shown in Figure 1.1, 51% of respondents disagreed. Close to 20% choose neither to 
agree nor disagree, while 30% agreed with the statement. This question is relatively new; 
the standard measure used for the past decade has read: “Recently there has been a lot of 
talk about women’s rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with 
                                                
1 This dissertation deals with beliefs about women in society and how those beliefs affect political 
choices, such as party affiliation, candidate evaluations, and attitudes toward certain gender 
policies; therefore, attitudes toward gender policies (for example, federal funding of programs that 
impact women) will not be used as proxy for beliefs about women (as often done in previous 
work). 




men running business, industry and government [suppose these people are at one nd f 
the scale, at point 1]. Others feel a woman’s place is at home [suppose these people are at 
one end of the scale, at point 7]” And of course, some people have opinions somewhere 
in between (at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) As shown in Figure 1.2, there is less variation in 
response compared to the new measure. Even when the categories in Figure 1.2 are 
collapsed into a 3 point distribution for ease of comparison with Figure 1.1, there is still 
little variation with over 75% of respondents choosing the highest value.  
 The increased variation in Figure 1.1 is most likely a result of the new measure’s 
avoidance of phrases that evoke social desirability, such as “Women should take care of 
the home,”3 and substitution with: “It is better for everyone involved if…” In other 
words, respondents recognize that they will be perceived negatively if they admit they 
believe a woman should stay at home. Changing the wording provides the respondent 
with a psychological out, so to speak, but yet still reaches the same conclusion.  Give  the 







                                                
3 Italics added. 
4 This measure is problematic, not only due to lack of variation, but plagued by both social 
desirability and the conflation of two issues (the role of the mother and women’s ability to perform 
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 The second statement reads: “Women often miss out on good jobs because of 
discrimination.” Interestingly, as demonstrated in Figure 1.3, there is less variation in the 
response as with other measures reviewed in this chapter. Generally speaking, most 
American believe that women do miss out on good jobs because of discrimination, with 
over 65% either agreeing strongly or agreeing somewhat with that statement. The 
remaining respondents chose one of the three other responses. Among respondents, less 
than 10% disagree strongly.  
 











Disagree Stronly Disagree Somewhat Niether Agree nor Disagree Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly
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 Figure 1.3 illustrates that a two-thirds majority of the Americans accept that 
women face discrimination. Interestingly, as shown in Figure 1.4, those sam respondents 
are uncomfortable with the idea of women attempting to rectify this situation. When 
respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement, “When 
women are demanding equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors,” we 
see that there is almost an even distribution among the available responses. Close to 20% 
respectively agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, and neither agree nor disagree. About 
30% disagree strongly, and less than 10% agree strongly. 
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Figure 1.5:  Distribution ‘Harassment’ Question 




















































are causing more problems than they solve
Women who complain about  harassment
 
  
 Carefully attempting to gauge feelings in the area of harassment and women in th  
workplace, an issue area cloaked in political correctness and social desirability, the 
ANES cleverly presents this statement to respondents: “Women who complain about 
harassment cause more problems than they solve.” As seen in Figure 1.5, respondents are  
conflicted about their opinion on women who complain about harassment, with close to 
50% of respondents disagreeing strongly or somewhat with the statement and close to 
50% agreeing strongly, agreeing somewhat or neither agreeing nor disagreeing.  
 Returning again to motherhood, respondents were read the following statement: 
“Working mothers can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with their children 




to this measure than previous ones.  A little over 60% of respondents b lieve that 
working mothers can establish comparably warm relationships with their children as 
mothers who stay home, and close to 30% neither agree nor disagree, or outright disagree 
with that statement. Future questions dealing with voter’s feelings toward working 
mothers should attempt to gauge feelings toward working mothers within context of 
different careers choices. Research has documented that one of the factors perpetuating 
the wage gap between women and men is that women overwhelmingly choose field , 
such as teaching and nursing, with low value for human capital and that allow them to 
leave and re-enter the labor market with little penalty. A more informative measure 
would place the hypothetical mother in a position that requires more capital and defies 
gender norms (i.e. a position with masculine characteristics such as a cop or C.E.O).
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of Ratings of Feminists 
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          Finally, I look at the electorate’s attitude toward feminists. As seen from the 
previous measures reviewed, the contemporary electorate has developed a nuanced 
approach to the many questions dealing with women and their rights in the workplace, the 
evolving role of motherhood, and so on. As shown in Figure 1.7, feeling thermometer 
rating of feminists is consistent with the trajectory of the previous data presented, 
illustrating a conflicted approach to a movement that has experience unprecedented 
success but almost equal vilification as a social group. Figure 1.7 shows a normal
distribution of responses. Most respondents place themselves down the middle of the 
road at 50 on the feeling thermometer scale (ranging from 0-100 with 0 representing cold 
feelings and 100 warm feelings). Previous research has shown a positivity bias may exist 




was generated from the remaining group thermometer scores on the ANES and then 






































The chapter begins with a review of the literature on gender and public opinion and then 
continues with a critique of current measures. Whereas past public opinion scholarship 
approached gender attitudes as a one-dimensional belief, hoping to capture an individual 
in the false dichotomy of feminist/anti-feminist, I introduce three g neral beliefs in regard 
to women that better account for variance in public opinion: beliefs about women’s 
opportunities, beliefs about motherhood and the family structure, and beliefs about 
assertive women. I conclude the chapter by empirically demonstratig that each belief is 
distinct and originates from different core values and characteristics. 
 
2.1 Gender and Public Opinion: State of the Literature 
The answers differ from one scholar to the next, from one discipline to 
another, and from year to year, not cumulating as they might, not reaching 
consensus about what should be kept in mind when analyzing gender … 
There are many good studies of gender and public opinion. But as it stands 
now, the literature is not yet more than the sum of its parts. That's not 




comes from the fact that the literature on gender and public opinion has 
emerged not as a self-contained literature but, rather, in the nooks and 
crannies of separate literatures. (Burns & Gallagher, 2010, p. 426) 
 Unfortunately, Burns and Gallagher’s description of the literature as disconnected 
is correct. There is a clear struggle to label sub-groups as feminist or anti-feminist, and to 
understand not only the mechanisms of feminist opinion but how that opinion affects 
political choices. Currently, recent research generally describes an American public that 
fully acknowledges the historical discrimination against women and current obstacles 
toward equality but yet refrains from identifying as feminists, and while collectively 
moving toward nontraditional gender attitudes, the public tends to hold only moderately 
progressive attitudes toward feminism (see Renzetti, 1987; Buschman & Lanart, 1996; 
Bennett and Bennett, 1999; Hudy, Neely, & LaFay, 2000: Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Aronson, 
2003).  
2.1.1 Feminist Identity and Opinion 
 “I’m not a feminist, but…” is the oft heard phrase muttered by many 
contemporary American women. This phrase is so prominent that it has almo t become 
cliché in some academic circles studying public opinion and feminis. The irony is not 
lost on scholars that a movement that has become so successful has also been almost 
equally vilified. How is it that Americans have developed more progressive attitudes 
towards feminist values but less positive attitudes toward feminis  as an identity? 
Previous research would tell us that feminist identity and values ar  two distinct 
concepts—each developing independently of the other (Rhodebeck, 1996; Huddy, Neely, 




Rhodebeck (1996) looks into the difference between feminist identity and 
feminist opinion using pooled American National Election Study (ANES) cross-sectional 
data from 1972 to 1992 and finds that the two are distinct (although somewhat related) 
constructs and that this is true over time regardless of gender. I  addition, Rhodebeck 
found that “identity has a stronger causal effect on opinion than vice versa. Opinion, 
however, is the more stable construct” (p.400). So whereas identifying as a feminist 
and/or having positive feelings toward the women’s movement predicts feminist 
opinions, Rhodebeck’s findings suggest that holding feminist opinions does not lead to 
identification or support of feminism as a group. There are a few problems with this 
study, however, that call for further work.  
Although the author looks at the relationship between feminist identity and 
feminist opinion and the impact of time and sex, the study is limited to data from 1972 to 
1992. Since 1992, much has happened that would suggest that the results might not be 
generalizable to 1992 through 2008. In addition to being slightly out of date, Rhodebeck 
(1996) included attitudes toward abortion as a measure of feminist opinion. Given, 
empirically, the recent debate surrounding the relationship between abortion attitudes and 
other feminist measures, it would be prudent to run the model again with a substitute 
measure (see Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1992; Heatherington & Weiler, 2009). Finally, 
Rhodebeck herself called for further research investigating the relationship between 
feminist identity and feminist opinions “vis-a-vis other groups” (p. 401).  
Nonetheless, Rhodebeck (1996) is far from the only scholar pointing out the need 
to conceptually distinguish between identification and opinion. In fact, as Huddy, Neely, 




gender consciousness to utilize variables that both measure attitudes toward feminist 
objectives/goals as well as feminist identification (see Cook, 1989; Cook & Wilcox, 
1991; Sapiro & Conover, 1997). The conventional wisdom in the literature is that 
measures relying on attitudes toward feminists as a group are no longer a reliable 
predictor of feminist values, and it is now rare to see researchers do so. 
Social identity theory, a social psychological theory, has been applied in recent 
work to help explain the growing disconnect between feminist opinion and feminist 
identification (see Huddy, 1997 and 2001). Political scientists often us thi  theory to 
help explain public opinion and political behavior. It posits that “social identity is derived 
from an individual’s self-categorization, the process by which the individual cognitively 
redefines the self in terms of group norms and the associated sterotypes of particular 
social categories” (Monroe, Hankin, & Van Vechten, 2000, p. 434). The self-
categorization theory, an extension of social identity theory, relies on group stereotypes. 
The more an individual sees themselves like the socially constructed prototype of a 
group—in this case the prototype feminist—the more an individual will see themselves a 
part of that group. This is why, as Huddy (2001) argues, women may hold feminist 
opinions but disassociate themselves from the movement because they do not “see” 
themselves as similar to the feminist prototype. Huddy also points ut that both in-group 
and outgroup members can contribute to the construction of the group prototype: 
During the battle over the Equal Rights Amendment, Phyllis Schlafly 
helped to define the meaning of feminism for many women by 
demonstrating that homemakers and women who were not pursuing 




define category membership is linked to Barth's (1981) view that much of 
the meaning of identity is created at its boundaries in interaction or 
dialogue with outgroup members. One obvious political implication of this 
finding is that group identity may be more diffuse and less intense in the 
absence of a clear outgroup to sharpen the meaning of group membership 
and identify the kinds of people who lie outside the group boundary. 
(Huddy, p. 145). 
Currently, a relatively small percentage of women and men consider themselves 
feminists (Huddy, Neely, & LaFay, 2000). What do scholars expect will predict feminist 
self-identification? To begin with, the more obvious indicators: a positive evaluation of 
feminists, a lack of conservative beliefs, and belief in collectiv  action (Myaskovsky 
&Wittig, 1997; Liss, et al., 2001). But as discussed, identification really boils down to 
how the individual “sees” the feminist prototype. “Just over a third of men and women 
think feminists dislike men, and just under fifty percent think feminists do not respect 
women who stay at home with their children” (Huddy, Neely &LaFay, 2001). Huddy 
(2001) went on to show that while the salience of feminism as an ide tity can be 
conditioned based on context, the cultural meaning cannot. Cultural meaning, or rather 
prototypes, takes a long time to change.  
 2.1.2 Gender Policy  
 Often, policies advancing the rights of women are used as a proxy for feminist 
opinion; therefore, attempting to understand how feminist opinions influence support or 
opposition for gender policy issues becomes quite complicated. Within the realm of 




policy (with the exception of the large amount of work done on abortion) (but see Wilcox 
& Sigelman, 201l; Wilcox, 1992). There is, however, a large literature on the gender 
differences concerning support for different policy in general, often referred to as the 
“gender gap” literature (Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Conover, 
1988; Wirls, 1986; Welch & Sigelman, 1992; Conover & Sapiro, 1997; Dolan, 1998; 
Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999).  
 Previous work on gender policy breaks it up into two groups: policy dealing with 
gender equity and policy dealing with role change (Gelb & Paltlet, 1982). Gelb and 
Paltley make the case that this is the most effective way to study gender issues, because 
gender equity tends to be ‘legalistic,’ while role change policy touches on core values. 
Gelb and Paltley first offer this categorization (as quoted in Burns & Gallagher, 2010): 
Role equity issues are those policies which extend rights now enjoyed by 
other groups (men, other minorities) to women and which appear to be 
relatively delineated or narrow in their implications, permitting policy 
makers to seek advantage with feminist groups and voters with little cost 
or controversy. In contrast, role change issues appear to produce change in 
the dependent woman role of wife, mother, and homemaker, holding out 
the potential of greater sexual freedom and independence in a variety of 
contexts. The latter issues are fraught with greater political pitfalls, 
including perceived threats to existing values, in turn creating visible and 




 Both Burns and Gallagher and Sanbotmatsu (2002) are quick to point out that 
there is some subjectivity involved in determining what is a ‘role change’ issue and what 
is a ‘role equity’ issue. 
Where an issue stands—whether it is about roles or equity or both—
depends on the tools ordinary Americans use to think about the particular 
issue. We do not think it is possible to “read” equity or roles from an 
actual policy. As an example, early on, scholars read the ERA as an equity 
issue (Carden, 1977), whereas later scholars read it as a role-change issue 
(Gelb & Palley, 1982). (Burns & Gallagher, p. 431) 
2.1.3  Mechanisms of Public Opinion 
 Bozendahl and Meyers (2004) most recently looked at what factors contribute to 
the formation of feminist opinion. Interestingly, they find a variety of results depending 
on which feminist “issue” they are examining. In some cases, certain characteristics 
predict feminist (or progressive) opinion within one issue area and anti-feminist views in 
another. Bozendahl and Meyers capture their dependent variable, feminist opinion, 
through measures on attitudes toward abortion, sexual behavior, public sphere gender
roles, and family responsibilities. Instead of collapsing the measur s of feminist opinion 
into an index score, the authors ran a separate model for each dependent variable, or as 
they refer to it, each issue domain.  
 For women, Bozendahl and Meyers (2004) found that employment is a strong 
predictor of feminist attitudes across all issue domains. This comes as no surprise as even 
Bozendahl and Meyers note that the relationship between women’s employment and 




also Glass, 1992; Klein, 1984; Banaszak & Plutzer, 1991; Rhodebeck, 1996). Bozendahl 
and Meyers also found an effect for the respondent’s family structure, with divorced 
women more likely to hold feminist attitudes, particularly when it came to issues of 
sexual behavior and family responsibility. In addition, the authors found mixed results 
based on the number of children for both men and women. Moreover, the more child n 
an individual has, the more likely he or she will have traditional views on sexual behavior 
and abortion; however, there is an “emerging” positive effect on attitudes toward family 
responsibility and public sphere gender issues. In addition to the respondent’s family 
structure, Bozendahl and Meyers found that religious traditionalism only matters on 
certain issues as did age. The variation of results across dependent variables suggests that 
more work should be done on how we conceptually understand feminist opinion. The fact 
that certain variables contribute to feminist opinion on some measures b t traditional 
opinion on others suggest that feminist opinion should no longer be approached as a one-
dimensional concept.  
Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox (1992) propose the idea of two distinctive types of 
feminist beliefs within the electorate, what they call “private” and “public” feminism in 
Between Two Absolutes: Public Opinion and the Politics of Abortion, when discussing 
the relationship between gender role attitudes and abortion. Cook et al. d scribe public 
feminism dealing with issues regarding women’s participation in politics and/or business, 
(for example, whether women are emotionally and intellectually capable), whereas 
private feminism deals with questions of woman superiority in terms of care giving and 




Other research has gone on to show that women who experience sexual 
discrimination are much more likely to hold feminist attitudes as well as self-identify as 
one compared to those who have not (Buschman & Lanart, 1996; Myaskovsky & Wittig, 
1997). Context, which comes as no surprise, continues to play a role with research 
demonstrating that not only is experience with discrimination a predictor of feminist 
attitudes, but employment in the workplace is as well. Smith (1985) found that women 
who work outside the home tend to hold more feminist attitudes on employment and 
familial roles as well as sexual behavior and general rights. In addition, the husbands of 
women who work outside the home were also found to hold more feminist attitudes 
across the board. Although Smith did not establish causation, it can be expected that the 
relationship is most likely reciprocal. 
In addition to determining what factors predict gender opinion, scholars have also 
struggled to form a consensus when it comes to labeling sub-groups. Gallagher (2004) 
found that it was misleading to label Evangelicals as either feminists or anti-feminists 
because of the complexities of their views as illustrated throug ne of her many in-depth 
interviews: “I believe women had to gain rights because women were alked on. ... They 
were treated horribly. They're under-paid, they still are in a lot of areas. But I think 
feminist groups now try to take the pants off the husband. ... In the work world, go for it. 
But I think the feminist movement kind of hurt the home structure a little bit, the family 
structure” (29-year-old charismatic father of one, Ohio) (p. 463). Though social 
conservatives may have once held monolithic traditional views on gender roles, ec nomic 
necessity and practical need may have begun to thwart this attitude, or at the very least, 




making the possibility of a single-family income less and less attainable. Gallagher 
(2004) found that although Evangelicals were critical of the “radicalization” of feminism, 
the majority were “cautiously appreciative” of the gains made by feminism (p. 460). 
There are still, however, recent studies that found the opposite in terms of results, that 
Evangelicals can be categorized as anti-feminists (see Wilcox & Larson, 2006). 
According to Wilcox and Larson, white Evangelicals are much more likely to believe 
working mothers cannot form warm and caring relationships with theirchildren when 
compared to stay-at-home mothers. 
2.1.4 What is Wrong with the Literature 
 The concept of feminism, or gender equality, means so many things to so many 
people. Therefore, scholars often use a variety of composite measures nd cales to 
capture feminist attitudes with the implicit assumption that any measure capturing 
attitudes towards any women’s issue is an equal and sufficient measure for all gender 
beliefs (for variation on measurements see Renzetti, 1987; Liss, O’Connor, Morosky, & 
Crawford, 2001; Aronson, 2003; Wilcox, 1989; Cook, 1989; Cook & Wilcox, 1991; 
Cook, Wilcox, & Jelen 1992; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999; Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; 
McCabe, 2005; Wilcox & Larson, 2006; Heatherington & Weiler, 2009). 
Unfortunately, this overly simplistic approach does not taken into account that the 
American public has formed a multi-dimensional conception of gender equality. By 
doing so the academic community runs the risk of masking important political 
phenomenon. No longer are “dichotomies such as feminist/antifeminist” appropriate in 
studies of attitudes toward feminism; this categorization in contemporary politics “masks 




1996, p.59). For example, Catholic women in the 1970s were frustrated with pay 
discrimination but yet were turned off of the women’s movement by discussions of 
abortion and sexuality (see Leege et al., 2002). 
Gender beliefs have been assessed using a variety of empirical measures over the 
years from attitudes toward abortion (see Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999) to attitudes oward 
working mothers (see Wilcox & Larson, 2006). Often, this is the result of a limited data 
set as well as a lack of dialogue within the subfield, which means that much of the 
previous empirical work on gender beliefs was dictated by data availability, not theory. 
The reason that public opinion specialists’ conceptualization of gender opinion is 
limited to a single dimension can be attributed to the failure of political science to provide 
for any discussion on gender (Silverberg 1990). According to Virginia Sapiro (1983); 
gender is the “sociocultural manifestations of being a man or woman … [the] learned 
characteristics, expectations, and patterns of behavior. Gender is learned significance of 
one’s sex” (as quoted in Silverberg, 1990, p. 889). Silverberg goes on to describe gender, 
as understood in political science, as simply “the outcomes of socialization processes that 
take place in a range of social institutions such as the family, the school, and the church” 
(p. 898). Silverberg urges political scientists to approach gender the sam way other 
disciplines do, as the relationship between the sexes, a private struggle for power. 
Political scientists often neglect anything outside of the public realm and therefore have 
failed to really engage in any discussion of gender equality. 
The other reason that political scientists treat gender opinion as e-dimensional 
can be attributed to the possibility that the public opinion field has overlooked (and 




The women’s movement, as described by Leege et al. (2002), “addresse  both a broad 
range of policy issues and the daily life experiences dealing with the economy, the 
military, language, the construction of history, family, and sexuality” (p. 209) and as such 
was fought not only on the policy front but quickly became entangled with symbolic 
politics and the culture war.  
As the movement grew in different directions and developed a broader scope, we 
have failed to see that a citizen’s gender values are not necessarily driven alone by beliefs 
about a woman’s proper place, but are also informed by general attitudes toward family 
needs and expectations of opportunity. To dismiss gender opinion to the simple 
dichotomy of feminist/anti-feminist misses the evolution of public opini n into separate 
domains of attitudes with distinct influence that fall under the umbrella of gender 
opinion. 
Though I draw on Burns and Gallagher (2010), as well as Cook, Jelen and Wilcox 
(1992), for theoretical support in arguing for a complex model of gender opinion, I differ 
in two ways: (1) I propose three distinct dimensions of gender opinion among the 
electorate: beliefs about women’s opportunities, beliefs about assertive women, and 
beliefs about the evolving family structure; and (2) In addition to my theoretical argument 
for a three- dimensional conception of feminism in the electorate, I also provide empirical 
support. I see these three beliefs as distinct, separate constructs. In o her words, simply 
because an individual is more progressive in one dimension (say the beliefs about 
women’s opportunities), this does not necessarily mean the same individual can be 
characterized as progressive when it comes to the remaining two dimensions (assertive 




 In the following section, I will elaborate on the three dimensions f gender 
opinion and will explore the theoretical underpinnings of each dimension a well as 
introduce empirical support. More importantly, I will conclude by identifying the 
different core values, personality traits, and socio-economic factors that influence each 
dimension, highlighting the distinct origin of each.  
 
2.2 Gender Beliefs 
In this chapter I propose a new way to conceptualize feminism for those who 
study mass public opinion—as a multi-dimensional concept composed of three distinct 
clusters of attitudes.5 As discussed in the previous chapter, the contemporary American 
electorate develops beliefs and subsequent attitudes about women and their role in society 
in three dimensions—referred to as dimensions throughout the dissertation. As this 
chapter demonstrates, each dimension is conceptually separate with differing predictive 
power and influenced by different core values and demographics—although, naturally, I 
do allow for some overlap.  
The first dimension deals with the beliefs about opportunities for women, in other 
words, belief about the difficulties women face and the importance of opportunity. The 
second dimension consists of attitudes toward the evolving family structure and role of 
the mother and will be referred to as the family structure dimension. The third dimension 
deals with attitudes towards assertive women, those who are seen a  likely to “complain” 
and bring attention to areas of perceived inequality. In other words, women who seek to 
                                                
5 I propose three distinct gender beliefs, but I leave open the possibility of additional gender beliefs. The 




empower women and defy gender norms. This dimension will be referred to as beliefs 
about assertive women.  
2.2.1 Dimension One: Beliefs about Women’s Opportunities 
 
When theorizing how the mass public would think about gender, it is helpful to 
begin with one of the most basic requirements of feminism: the recognition that some sort 
of institutional and/or cultural discrimination actually exists and the desire to achieve 
equality between the sexes. The first dimension, therefore, dealswith the beliefs about 
opportunities for women and the desire to see women achieve full equality with men, not 
only in terms of pay and representation but in all areas of inequality. 
It is certainly possible to construct a base-line definition of feminism and 
the feminist which can be shared by feminist and non-feminist. Many 
would agree that at the very least a feminist is someone who holds that 
women suffer discrimination because of their sex, that they have specific 
needs which remain negated and unsatisfied, and that the satisfaction of 
these needs would require a radical change (some would say a revolution 
even) in the social, economic, and political order. But beyond that, things 
immediately become more complicated (Delmar, 1986, p. 8) 
As activist and writer Rosalin Delmar also notes, a baseline definition of feminism 
includes recognition of discrimination against women. It is not uncommn, however, for 
both men and women to believe that the feminist movement successfully achieved parity 
for women that women no longer face obstacles, and the movement is now obs lete. This 
argument has been the justification for those wishing to see the abolishment of many 




certain affirmative action policies. At the same time, there are many Americans, pointing 
to discrepancies in pay between men and women and unequal representation i various 
levels of government as examples of contemporary issues, who feel strongly that women 
are not treated equally.  
The 2008 presidential primaries, with the historic contest between Barack Obama 
and Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination, almost inevitably, rought about the 
debate of who “had it worse”: blacks or women. The sentiment that women, as a social 
group, no longer face barriers is present in the elite, the media, and the electorate as well. 
Even the most recent American National Elections Studies in 2008 found that, when 
surveyed, 30% of the respondents did not agree with the statement that women often miss 
out on good jobs because of discrimination.  
Additionally, some people may believe that equal opportunity for women is 
simply not that important or that it is not a priority and this, as well, makes up an 
important component of the opportunities dimension. The recognition that equal 
opportunities for women are important is an argument many activists feel they have to 
make to a growingly disinterested or skeptic younger generation of women.  
 
2.2.2 Dimension Two: Beliefs About the Evolving Concept of Motherhood and Family 
Structure 
 
…It doesn't help matters when primetime TV has Murphy Brown, a 
character who supposedly epitomizes today's intelligent, highly paid 
professional woman, mocking the importance of fathers by bearing  child 




a San Francisco political event in 1992 as reported by Rosenthal, New 
York Times 1992) 
 It has been well over a decade since Former Vice President Dan Quayle took on 
the fictitious character Murphy Brown in a quest to bring national attention to what he 
saw as dwindling family values. The debate, however, over the evolving structure of the 
American family, marches on; from issues over single-motherhood and working mothers 
to stay-at-home moms. The family structure dimension has received a lot of attention. 
The so-called ‘mommy wars,’ clearly striking a nerve with society, has become a media 
and publishing industry sensation. As E.J. Graff in a 2007 online Washington Post article 
describes it: 
The Mommy Wars sell newspapers, magazines, TV shows and radio 
broadcasts, as mothers everywhere seize on the subject and agonize, in 
spite of themselves. "Every other week there's an article saying that if you 
don't work, you're in trouble financially, and if you do work, your child is 
at risk," a single mother of three who works part time told me. An 
especially inflammatory article or episode can increase Web site hits, 
achieve "most e-mailed" status, drag more outraged viewers or listeners to 
the phone lines.... (Graff 2007) 
The ‘mommy wars,’ as played out in the media, is an extension of a larger debate within 
feminism over the role of ‘choice feminists’ in the movement. Choice feminists are 
women who believe that the feminist movement was fought to provide women with 
choices and that no woman should be faulted for the private choices she makes within her 




in Playboy. Recently, Perspectives on Politics (March 2010) ran a symposium on choice 
feminism. Jennet Kirkpatrick (2010) summarized the Perspectives ymposium and noted 
that: “Choice feminists are best known for their argument that a woman who leaves the 
remunerated labor market to care for her children is a feminist in good standing; she 
makes a feminist decision” (p. 241). The symposium goes on to discuss the validity of the 
argument made by choice feminists, who feel that as long as a woman has the choice to 
pursue a career and the choice to stay at home then she does not violate feminist values. 
Critics point out that choice feminists do in fact hurt the movement. If women continue to 
perpetuate the “opt-out” revolution, employers will begin to see women as potential 
liabilities.  
 The dimension of feminism dealing with motherhood and family structu e is 
much more complex than the simple belief or disbelief that women ar  best suited as 
mothers and that their value is measured by their ability to get married and to raise 
children. It deals with questions of juggling both career and child, what e as a society 
should expect of fathers, and, most importantly, how much motherhood should really be a 
part of a woman’s identity, of her self-worth—if at all.  
Dimension 3: Beliefs about Assertive Women 
When I hear a statement like that coming from a woman candidate 
with any kind of perceived whine about that excess criticism or you kn w 
maybe a sharper microscope put on her, I think, 'man that doesn't do us 
any good'—women in politics, women in general wanting to progress thi  
country, I don't think it bodes well for her, a statement like that. Because, 




I think people can just accept that she is going to be under the sharper 
microscope. So be it. I mean, work harder, prove yourself to an even 
greater degree that you're capable, that you're going to be the best 
candidate, and that of course is what she wants us to believe at this point. 
So it bothers me a little bit hearing her bring that attention to herself on 
that level. (Sarah Palin, discussing Clinton’s claims of sexism in the media 
as reported by Think Progress “Flashback: Palin Said that ‘Women 
Complaining About Excess Criticism Don’t Do Us Any Good’ ” 2009) 
 The third dimension of gender beliefs captures attitudes towards women 
empowering themselves and bringing attention to perceived inequalities. Feminism was 
fought not only within the public sphere by activists and leaders like Gloria Steinem, but 
also in everyday interactions of the private sphere. In order for policies meant to prevent 
discrimination and sexual harassment to be successful, women have to t k advantage of 
of them and call attention to the practice when it happens report such occurrences, but 
they are reluctant to do so because of the stigma of appearing to be “whiny,” or asking for 
special favors when doing so. Therefore, it is appropriate to include a dimension 
capturing attitudes toward women empowering themselves—in other words, speaking up.  
Kinder and Kam’s (2009) recently published in-depth investigation into the role 
of ethnocentrism, Us vs. Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion, f und 
that it had no effect on most of the measures used for women, such as women’s issues, 
abortion, and women—that is until they measured for “a certain kind of woman.” When 
they looked into the effects of ethnocentrism on attitudes toward women, they get results 




If this is right, at least to a first approximation, then ethnoce trism might 
still be activated by women of a particular kind …[who] see harassment 
and discrimination everywhere, and are constantly pushing for change. … 
One question present in the 2004 NES gets close to what we have in mind. 
There, respondents were asked whether women who complain about 
sexual harassment cause more problems than they solve. The issue here 
would appear to be not women in general, and not even sexual harassment 
as a problem, but rather the trouble made by the kind of woman who 
complains about sexual harassment. And on this proposition we find a 
very powerful effect for ethnocentrism. … Nothing else in our analysis of 
issues raised by the women’s movement is remotely like this. Not women 
in general, but women of a particular kind, trigger ethnocentrism. (p. 179-
180) 
Kinder and Kam’s findings further suggests that Americans have a distinct cluster of 
attitudes toward out-spoken, “pushy” women in the area of women’s equality.  
While at first glance the discrimination dimension and the empowerment 
dimension may seem similar, they are very much separate constructs. Although 
individuals may acknowledge discrimination, they may still develop negativ  titudes 
toward the attempts to remedy the situation; they may perceive these individuals as 
seeking special favors or weak. The aforementioned quote from Sarah Palin, criticizing 
Clinton for bringing up sexism, illustrates the feelings that many men and women have 
toward women who draw attention to areas of perceived injustice, even if they agree 





2.3  The Three Dimensions: Empirical Evidence 
 
To test the argument that gender opinion is best studied in three distinct 
dimensions, I turn to confirmatory factor analysis and the 2008 ANES, the most recent 
one.6 Throughout the 2008 ANES a total of seven indicators were discovered, which—
although not ideal—adequately capture what I had in mind for each dimension. Two 
indicators measure the belief about women’s opportunities. The first ask  respondents 
whether they believe “women miss out on good jobs because of discrimination.” And the 
second asks: “Do you personally hope that the United States has a woman President in 
your lifetime, do you hope the United States does not have a woman President in your 
lifetime, or do you not hope either way?”  
Three indicators address the second dimension, beliefs about motherhood and the
evolving family structure.  The first asks respondents whether they believe “a working 
mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her c ildren as a mother 
who does not work.” The second asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with 
the statement: “It is much better for everyone involved if the manis the achiever outside 
the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.” Finally, the third asks 
respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement: “The world would be a 
better place if people focused on traditional family ties more.”  
Finally, two other indicators measure the third dimension, beliefs about assertive 
women. Although potentially the most difficult to measure because the indicators prod 
respondents to give socially undesirable responses, the ANES utilizes two cleverly 
                                                





constructed questions that get at the heart of this dimension. The first indicator asks 
respondents whether they agree with the following statement: “Women who complain 
about harassment cause more problems than they solve.” The second asks respondents 
whether they agree with the following statement: “When women demand equality these 
days, they are actually seeking special favors.” 
When all of the available measures of gender attitudes in the 2008 ANES are run 
in an exploratory factor analysis, three distinct factors appear. Two of the three retained 
factors had an eigenvalue > 1 with the final eigenvalue falling right under the 1.0 cutoff 
at .998. Each measure loads as expected.7 The variance is displayed in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1: Factor Loadings          
     Beliefs about Women’s   Beliefs about       Beliefs about 
           Opportunities        Motherhood      Assertive Women 
‘Women who complain   
about equality…’   .1559           .1191  .7527 
 
‘Women who complain 
about harassment…’   -.0314           -.0074    .8281 
 
‘Women face discrimination’  .8801           -.0315  -.0121 
 
‘Important to see woman 
President…’    .5769            .3035  .2357 
 
‘Moms who work…’   .0661            .8224  -.0981 
 
‘Better if the man achieves’  .0214            .6357  .3951 
 
‘Focus on traditional   -.1112            .5056  .3850 
Family ties…’ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: 2008 ANES. Sample only contains whites. N=1,295. Orthogonal rotation. 
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To compliment the earlier factor analysis, I turn to confirmatory factor analysis to 
test the significance of the factor loadings as well as the fit of the overall model compared 
to other possibilities, such as a one-factor or two-factor model. It is especially important 
to compare the fit of the two-factor compared to the three-factor model, given the third 
retained factor had an eigenvalue just slightly under 1. As demonstrated in Table 2.2 and 
Table 2.3, the confirmatory factor analysis supports the earlier findings that the mass 
public conceptualizes feminism as three-dimensional.  
Though the hypothesized three-factor model does not pass the chi square test, it is 
a good fit according to the remaining four out of five fit tests. Given the large sample size 
(1,295), the chi square test may be unreliable anyway. The four remaining tests all 
indicate a goodness of fit for Model 1, the hypothesized three-factor model. The Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) which specifies the amount of 
unexplained variance, is below the .06 cut-off at .053 (Bentler & Hu, 1999). The 
Bentler’s Comparative Fit Index (CFI) as well as the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and the 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) are all larger than the .95 criteria for a goodness of fit. Finally, 
the Weighted Root Mean Square Residual (WRMR) is under the .9 criteria. Therefore, I 
am able to accept the model in regard to the fit statistics. 
 The goodness of fit for two additional factor solutions was tested as well. 
Confirmatory factor analysis was run with a one-factor and two-factor solution, in 
addition to the hypothesized three-factor model. The original three-factor solution with 
the hypothesized observed variables was the best fit as seen in Table 2.2. Both the one-




Each of the path coefficients is statistically significant, and each of the 
standardized estimates is larger than .32, as seen in Table 2.3 (Hatcher, 1994; Billings & 




Table 2.2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Goodness of Fit Statistics 
                 Model 1                  Model 2           Model 3    
          
   (three factor)     (one factor)         (two factor)         
Chix   50.118     213.822  140.096 
                     df=10      df=13   df=12 
  Pr<.000       Pr<.000  Pr<.000 
 
RMSEA  .053        .104   .086 
 
CFI   .997       .985   .991 
TLI    .996       .986   .991 
WRMR  .804      1.730             1.370 
N=1,295 



















                                                











Table 2.3: CFA with Standardized Estimates and  Errors 
           Standardized  S.E.  Est./S.E.            P-Values   
           Estimates        
Discrimination        
 
Women miss out on good    .667  .014    46.299               p<.000  
 jobs because of    
discrimination.               
 
 Would you like to see a       .874  .015   56.504      p<.000 
 Woman president? 
 
Family Structure          
 
Working Mom          .823  .013   62.547                 p<.000      
             
Man achieves                     .884  .010   86.269        p<.000   
       




Harassment/Problems          .789                    .012    68.485        p<.000 
        
Equality/Favors          .841             .012   69.898        p<.000        
  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: 2008 ANES; N=1,295;  















2.3  Gender Opinion: The Impact of Demographics, Core Values, and Personality 
Traits on Gender Predispositions 
 
How can Americans hold contradictory attitudes on many issues that fall under 
the realm of feminism? Although the knee-jerk reaction for some political scientist might 
be the ‘Conversian’ lack of constraint among gender ideology, the real reason is that a 
different set of core values, demographic characteristics, and personality traits heavily 
influence each cluster of beliefs. Therefore, it is not unreasonable (nor surprising) to find 
groups of individuals who, for example, believe that women deserve equal pay for equal 
work, but also believe that working mothers hurt the family structure and unfairly neglect 
children. As demonstrated in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, a different compilation of core 
values and demographics predict each dimension with varying degrees of influence. The 
dependent variables presented in Table 2.4 are the scores from the factor analysis for each 
dimension of gender beliefs ranging from -2 to 2. Because the depen nt variables are 
treated as continuous, the appropriate statistical tool is OLS. 9 
Included in Table 2.4 are core values, the fundamental building blocks of attitudes 
and belief systems. They are our very general, abstract approach to l rger questions about 
life and how we should live and heavily influence our beliefs and attitudes (Jacoby, 
2002). In the following models, I investigate the effect of three commonly studied core 
values within the electorate: moral traditionalism, egalitarianism, and limited government 
(sometimes referred to as individualism) on the three dimensions of feminism. As you 
will see, each core value plays a different role depending on the particular dimension.  
In addition to core values, I have included personality traits and chara teristics 
that may influence our predispositions in regard to the dimensions of feminism. 
                                                




Authoritarianism, a characteristic similar to a core value, but perhaps more appropriately 
described as a personality trait, has been described as “hav[ing] a greater than average 
need for order. In contrast, those who score lower in authoritarianism have more comfort 
with ambiguous shades of gray, which can allow for nuanced judgments” (Heatherington 
& Weiler, 2009). In Heathering and Weiler’s recent in-depth investigation of 
authoritarianism, Divided We Stand: Polarization, Authoritarianism, and the 
Contemporary Political Divide, it was often compared to approaches on disciplining 
children (i.e. individuals who are authoritarian lean toward spanking, while those who are 
not often prefer using time-outs). 
The second important characteristic is religious traditionalism. Measured through 
one’s church attendance, reliance on religion for guidance, and frequency of prayer, it 
captures a respondent’s adherence to religious beliefs and commitment. Some have 
described religiosity as capturing the difference between devout Catholics and the 
“cafeteria Catholics,” as some might say. It is important to include religiosity when 
investigating the factors influencing gender beliefs because traditional religion is often 
depicted as being in conflict with the women’s movement. “Although other issues 
became part of the mix, emancipated women and morally traditionalist churches best 
represent the clash between emerging and settled moral orders that loomed so large in the 
1980’s and beyond” (Leege, Wald, Krueger, & Mueller, 2002, p.  203). Gallagher and 
Smith (1999) and Gallagher (2004) suggest, however, that in regard to white 
Evangelicals, attitudes toward feminism are more nuanced than previous literature has 
acknowledged and that the antiquated labels of feminist/anti-feminist are no longer 




addition to core values and characteristics, each model includes a set of potentially 
influential aspects of demographics, which are gender, age, income, education, residency 
in the south, race, and marital status. 10 
 
Table 2.4: The Effect of Socio-Demographics and Core Values on  
Beliefs about Women’s Opportunities                              
     Coefficient    P Value  Coefficient      P Value  
                                                   Women                  Men     
Socio-Demographics:    
 Age      .005   .139         .007  .179 
     (.003)              (.005) 
 Income    -.014  .108              -.023  .070 
      (.009)    (.030) 
 Education      .086  .055    .002  .953 
      (.044)              (.048) 
  South       .174   .132       .185  .217 
        (.115)              (.149) 
 Married     -.026     .842    -.079  .722 
      (.135)               (.223) 
Core Values: 
 Moral Traditionalism            -.134  .021  -.153  .021 
     (.053)    (.065) 
 Egalitarianism               .122  .107   .227  .006 
               (.075)    (.082) 
 Limited Government     .298  .050   .251  .171 
               (.151)               (.183) 
Personality Traits 
 Authoritarianism  - .151  .476  -.180  .585 
     (.213)    (.330) 
             Religious    -.287*  .000    .040  .673 
            Traditionalism  (.073)    (.096) 
Constant    .194  .610  -.683  .153 
               (.380)    (.476) 
     
    R2= .185   R2=.183 
                                                            N=259               N=184        
Source: 2008 ANES; Whites only 
Note: OLS coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable coded so that the hig r 
value represents the more progressive approach.  
                                                
10  Each model presented in Tables 2.4 -2.6 was checked for multicollinearity. VIF scores were 
low (never exceeding 2.0) indicated there is no concer  for multicollinearity. Additionally, the low 
sample size is due to the low number of cases in the religious traditionalism index. Given the 




Table 2.5: The Effect of Socio-Demographics and Core Values on Beliefs Regarding 
Motherhood and Family Structure                               
     Coefficient    P Value  Coefficient      P Value  
                                                   Women                  Men     
Socio-Demographics:    
 Age    -.000   .809        -.009  .018 
     (.003)               (.004) 
 Income     .017  .082                -.007  .567 
     (.010)    (.013) 
 Education     .108  .015        .068*  .143 
      (.044)              (.046) 
  South     -.214  .065        .158  .241 
      (.115)              (.134) 
 Married    -.156         .248   .028  .893 
     (.135)              (.214) 
Core Values: 
 Moral Traditionalism             -.165  .002  -.193  .004 
      (.053)    (.066) 
 Egalitarianism               .155  .123   .056  .450 
                (.074)    (.074) 
 Limited Government     .262*  .079   .036  .841 
                (.148)               (.182) 
Personality Traits 
 Authoritarianism   -.550  .018  -1.19  .000 
      (.232)    (.316) 
             Religious    -.121  .112 -.026  .788 
             Traditionalism     (.076)    (.099) 
Constant     .331  .385   .885  .052 
                (.381)    (.453) 
     
    R2= .232   R2=.247 
                                                            N=259    N=184        
Source: 2008 ANES; Whites only 
Notes: OLS coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable coded so that the hig r 




Table 2.6: The Effect of Socio-Demographics and Core Values on Beliefs about Assertive 
Women            
     Coefficient    P Value  Coefficient      P Value  
                                                   Women                  Men     
Socio-Demographics:    
 Age    -.002  .493         -.001  .731 
     (.003)               (.004) 
 Income     .015            .128              .015  .283 
     (.010)    (.014) 
 Education    .182            .000      .062  .182 
     (.041)                        (.046) 
  South      .029            .791       -.049  .724 
      (.132)              (.139) 
 Married     .078              .560   -.315  .047 
      (.134)               (.157) 
Core Values: 
 Moral Traditionalism               .056  .341   .016  .807 
      (.056)    (.066) 
 Egalitarianism               .246  .001   .164  .067 
                (.074)    (.088) 
 Limited Government     .171  .250  .224*  .178 
                (.148)              (.165) 
Personality Traits 
 Authoritarianism  -.718  .000  -.429  .275 
     (.198)    (.276) 
             Religious             .018  .780   .002  .977 
             Traditionalism  (.067)    (.091)   
Constant               -.816  .031  -.479  .296 
                (.376)    (.456) 
     
    R2= .255   R2=.187 
                                                            N=259    N=184        
Source: 2008 ANES; Whites only 
Notes: OLS coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable coded so that the hig r 















As we can see from the results presented in Tables 2.4-2.6, core values, 
characteristics, and demographics influence the three dimensions. For instance, residency 
in the South influences women attitudes about motherhood, but that’s it. Being Southern 
has no effect on what you feel about women’s opportunities or what you think about 
assertive women. And though making more money leads most women to hold more 
progressive attitudes toward motherhood, it comes close to statistical ignificance for 
 Dimension 1) 
Belief about  
Women’s Opportunities 
Dimension 2) 
Belief about Motherhood 
 
Dimension 3) 
Belief about Assertive 
Women 
 































































predicting more dismissive attitudes about women’s opportunities. As seen in Table 2.7, 
a summary table, each belief, for both men and women, is a separate cons ruct influenced 
by distinctive factors. 
 Before I investigate the predictive power of each dimension within the context of 
political choices and evaluations, I pause to examine how this new approach illuminates 
what we know about the electorate. The following tables present the mean factor scores 
(factor scores were re-coded 0-1 for ease of interpretation) by demographics.  
 






Man .63 .56 .53 
Woman .68 .61 .58 
 Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean 
scores ranging from 0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive response.  
Cells with less than 50 respondents were not included and cells with less than 
100 respondents were noted with an asterisk.  
 







 $75,000 .67 .58 .56 
Over 
$75,000 .65 .59 .56 
Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean 
scores ranging from 0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive response.  Cells 
with less than 50 respondents were not included and cells with less than 100 




















Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean scores ranging from 
0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive respone.  Cells with less than 50 respondents were not 
included and cells with less than 100 respondents were noted with an asterisk.  
 












Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean scores ranging from 
0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive respone.  Cells with less than 50 respondents were not 
included and cells with less than 100 respondents were noted with an asterisk.  
 
 





South Man .64 .55 .51 
 Woman .69 .57 .56 
Non-South Man .63 .56 .54 







Democrat Less than 30 .65 .66 .63 
 30-50 .69 .64 .63 
 50+ .70 .58 .56 
Republican Less than 30 .56* .63* .52* 
 30-50 .62 .57 .57 
 50+ .66 .50 .48 
Independent Less than 30 -- -- -- 
 30-50 .63* .56* .58* 













Man .66 .60 .58 
 
Woman .71 .64 .61 
Republican 
Man .60 .52 .49 
 
Woman .64 .56 .54 
Independent 
Man .64* .54* .53* 
 
Woman .66* .63* .55* 
 
Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean scores ranging 
from 0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive response.  Cells with less than 50 




          Table 2.13: Mean Score for Gender Beliefs by Educational Attainment 










Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean scores ranging from 
0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive respone.  Cells with less than 50 respondents were not 













.67 .55 .50 




         Overall, on average, the electorate proves to be the most progressive when it comes 
to beliefs about women’s opportunities. As Tables 2.8-2.13 demonstrate, this is consistent 
across demographics. The electorate also appears to be slightly more progressive when it 
comes to beliefs about motherhood compared to beliefs about assertive women; however, 
this difference is often small. When I examine the difference between sexes, Table 2.8, it 
is clear women are more progressive on each dimension of gender beliefs than men. 
Further examining this break between southerners and non-southerners by sex, Table 
2.10, it is evident that there is almost no difference between southerners and non-
southerners when it comes to beliefs about women’s opportunities. Moreover, there is no 
substantive difference between Southerners and Non-Southern men in regard to beliefs 
about motherhood. Non-Southern women, however, prove to stand out in their 
progressive views on motherhood. Finally, there does appear to be a difference between 
Southerners and non-Southerners when it comes to beliefs about assertive women with 
Southern men the most conservative and Non-southern women the most progressive—
Southern women and Non-Southern men are somewhat similar and more moderate than 
their counter-parts. Finally, as shown in Table 2.12, party identification trumps sex with 
Democrats proving to be more progressive than Republicans within each dimension 
regardless of sex. On average, Democratic men are slightly more progressive on each 
dimension (albeit the difference is small). 
               Considering the women’s movement has progressed overtime it is natural to 
expect some variation within each age cohort and dimension. As shown in Table 2.11, 
younger cohorts prove slightly more progressive than the next in each dimension xcept 




Democrats respondents over the age of 50 have a mean score .05 points higher than those 
under 30 years of age (score ranging from 0-1). Republicans over the age of 50 have a 
mean score .1 higher (on a 0-1 scale) regarding belief about women’s opportunities 
compared to Republicans under the age of 30. So while young age contributes to more 
progressive beliefs within two dimensions of feminism dealing with beliefs about 
motherhood and assertive women, it also contributes to more traditional beliefs in regard 
to women’s opportunities. Given that many young women have yet to start fully pursuing 
careers, attempting to balance motherhood and home demands, and really begin to 
engage in a struggle for power and success they have yet to experience the struggl s of 
the women before them. For that matter, the same is true for men in that they have yet to 
witness this imbalance of power of their sisters, women friends and wives. 
           There appears to be no substantive difference between the three dimensions of 
gender beliefs in regard to household income as shown in Table 2.9. Households making 
over $75,000, on average, are no different than household making under $75,000. 
Moreover, there appears to be difference within educational attainment between thos  
with college degrees and those without within the context of beliefs about women’s 
opportunities. There does, however, appear to be a difference between those with college 
degrees and those without when it comes to beliefs about motherhood and belief about 
assertive women—with the college educated more progressive.  
Feminism is a loaded term that has evolved over the past century i American 
politics. As the elite, activists, and normative theorists grapple with what it actually 
means to be a feminist, this chapter looked into how the American electorate processes 




concerned, feminism, gender equality, is a nuanced and multi-dimensional concept with 
beliefs about women and gender roles clustering around three key areas: belief about 
women’s opportunities, motherhood and the family, and assertive women. Because 
beliefs and opinions have formed in such a way, it is neither surpi ing nor unreasonable 
to find citizens with varying beliefs across the dimensions. After all, as tested in this 
chapter, a different set of demographics and core values predict each dimension. The 
question left unanswered is how these dimensions influence our political evaluations and 












Gender Beliefs and Abortion Attitudes:  
The Misunderstood Relationship 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Abortion has a long standing history as a contentious and polarizing issue within 
American politics. The debate surrounding abortion has led individuals to mobilize, 
groups to form, and in some extreme cases, it has even led to terrorism and 
assassinations. For example, in 2009, Dr. George Tiller, one of the few doctors providing 
abortions in Kansas, was gunned down in broad daylight. Needless to say, abortion has a 
major impact on American politics and will continue to shape it for some time.  
Scholars have dubbed abortion an “easy issue” (Carmines & Stimson, 1989; 
Carsey & Layman, 2006) because people tend to hold consistent views and need little 
technical information to form an opinion; instead, most Americans have a ‘gut’ response. 
Unlike many other issues, attitudes toward abortion remain steady over time for both the 
individual and the aggregate (Converse & Markus, 1979; Sharpe, 1999; Wilcox & 
Norrander, 2002; Wilcox & Riche, 2002). Highlighting the influential power of abortion 
within the world of public opinion and political behavior, Jelen and Wilcox (2003) point 




greater than any that our standard models would predict” (p. 489). Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that within the intersection of the gender and public opinion sub-fields, the issue 
of abortion has dominated the literature—not just as the subject of study, but sometimes 
as the all-encompassing proxy for gender attitudes (Wilcox, 1989; Rhodeback, 1996, 
Emerson, 1996; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999).  
I demonstrate in this chapter that this past approach of confounding gender and 
abortion attitudes (while often the result of limited data sets) is misleading and fails to 
fully illuminate the relationship between the two. More specifically, I demonstrate that 
beliefs about women’s opportunities and assertive women have no relationship with 
abortion attitudes at all. Beliefs about motherhood, however, play an important role in the 
formation of abortion attitudes.  
 
3.2   The American Public and the Abortion Debate 
Abortion has not always been the major cultural issue it is today. Luker (1985) reminds 
us that there was a time, women could not tell if they were pregnant until far into the 
pregnancy. Luker notes that women were neither constantly being updated on he status 
of the fetus nor receiving sonogram pictures or other various informati n now considered 
normal during pregnancy. Tests were not available, so a woman could only confirm 
pregnancy when she could clearly feel the baby moving inside her, w ich is far into a 
pregnancy. Historically, women simply did not have the same relationsh p with their 
pregnancies that they do today. Therefore, women often engaged in activ ties referred to 
as “returning the menses” before quickening occurred. It was not considered abortion, 




The criminalization of abortion did not happen until the nineteenth century. 
During this time period, some feminists opposed abortion. They believed (at a time when 
not only contraception but also dissemination of information on contraception was 
illegal) that women should have access to contraception in order to eliminate the need for 
an abortion all together (Coryell & Faires, 2012). At this time, Women were denied 
access to birth control, birth control information, and abortion, but yet women who 
conceived out of wedlock carried a heavy stigma and often faced reprcussions such as 
expulsion from school. Therefore, it was not uncommon for women to seek out illegal 
abortions or take the matter into their own hands. History tells of women who would 
throw themselves down stairs, hit their stomachs, consume a variety of potions, or carry 
out a variety of other dangerous attempts to terminate a pregnancy. Coryell and Faires 
note that 23% of all pregnancy related hospital visits in 1969 were a result of an illegal 
abortion (or an attempted illegal abortion).  
 Women’s organizations really began to push for and succeed in securing abortion 
rights and access to contraception in the late 60s. In 1969, the first abortion law repeal 
group, the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL) formed 
(Coryell & Faires, 2012). In 1970, both Hawaii and Alaska ended restrictions placed on 
abortion procedures, and in certain states, like Texas, the state courts overturned laws 
banning abortion. It was not until 1973, however, that a woman’s right to abortion was 
secured with the Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision. It established that women have a 
constitutional right to an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy based off the 
previous Griswald v. Connecticut Supreme Court decision, which ruled for a 




 Abortion, at that time, had been growing as a hot-button issue, and the Roe v. 
Wade decision sparked an even more heated debate that stills continues to thi day. 
Powerful groups, such as EMILY’s List, NARAL, NOW, Susan B. Anthony List, and the 
Family Foundation, were born from this debate and continue to mobilize, recruit and 
engage citizens to this day—they make up some of the most powerful omen’s groups in 
the political arena.  
 Given that abortion is such a long-standing, contentious issue hijacking much of 
the political debate and spurring unprecedented political activity, it is mportant to 
thoroughly grasp what influences abortion attitudes. What are the core valu s nd 
characteristics that lead to such strongly held opinions? For as much attention as abortion 
attitudes has received, the literature leaves important areas, such as the role of gender 
attitudes, unclear and underdeveloped.  
 
3.3 Capturing Abortion Attitudes  
 Though measures exist for more nuanced circumstances surrounding abortion 
(traumatic abortions v. elective abortions)—these particular circumstances have been 
shown to matter for opinion formation—for the purposes of this chapter, I am not 
concerned with highlighting each particular situation categorized as a traumatic abortion 
on its own because they are relatively uncommon. A survey found that of all abortions 
reported in 1992 only seven percent were considered non-elective (or trauma ic) 
abortions (Cook, Jelen & Wilcox, 1992). Therefore, I will use the standard four point 
abortion measure, ranging from always prohibit, to only legal in the cas of rape, incest 




if a need has been established, to always allow as a matter of choice. This measure allows 
for some variation within the ‘conditional sphere’—between the two extremes—but does 
not get into situational specifics like the new American National Election Studies 
(ANES) measure, which asks more questions specifically about abortions, such as those 
pertaining to financial considerations and concern with the fetus’s gender. As shown in 
Figures 3.1-3.3 (using the 2008 ANES), this approach provides a useful amount of 
variation within the measure.  
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Figure 3.2: Contemporary Abortion Attitudes by Party Affiliation 
  
Source: 2008 ANES. Note: Sample does not include African-Americans 
 Figure 3.3: Contemporary Abortion Attitudes by Education 
  




As demonstrated in Figure 3.1, a plurality of Americans (39%) believes abortion should 
be allowed at all times as a matter of choice, with only 16% reporting that abortion 
should always be prohibited. Circumstances surrounding abortion condition most 
Americans’ attitudes, with 28% of respondents allowing abortion in cases of rape, incest, 
or danger to the mother’s health and 17% allowing abortion in cases in which a need has 
been established. If we were to collapse these two categories, almost half of Americans 
would fall into the conditional category. 
When breaking the general white population into groups, it is interesting to see 
that although men are slightly less restrictive when it comes to abortion (13% of men say 
always prohibit, whereas 16% of women say always prohibit), they are also much less 
permissive (32% of men say abortion should always be allowed compared to 42% of 
women.) Though Democrats are most likely to support abortion in all cases as a matter of 
choice (46%), Independents are most likely to be least restrictive, with less than 10% 
prohibiting abortion in all cases compared to 12% of Democrats who feel abortion should 
be prohibited in all cases. Moreover, 2008 ANES data, as shown in Figure 3.3, is 
consistent with previous research that suggests higher education leads to higher rates of 
support for abortion rights in all cases as a matter of choice. 
 
3.4 Social Characteristics of Abortion Attitudes 
Education, especially for women, plays a key role in shaping attitudes across 
demographics toward abortion. It has appeared as a robust predictor of a titudes toward 
abortion since the issue first exploded into the world of public opinion. Naturally, as an 




households are more supportive of abortion rights (Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox 1992). Wilcox 
and Jelen (2003) note, however, that the relationship between education and abortion has 
been declining; the correlation has dropped from .31 in the 70s to .14 in 2000. 
Nonetheless, education remains, across the electorate, a stable and robust predictor of 
attitudes when compared to other demographic characteristics. It is not the only predictor 
of abortion attitudes that has shifted over time. For example, religious denomination 
(such as Catholicism) tended to predict abortion attitudes; however, that has waned over 
time, and religious traditionalism has taken its place (Strickler & Danigelis, 2002).  
While gender might seem like an intuitive, natural predictor of abortion attitudes, 
given that whether abortion stays legal or become illegal disproporti nately affects 
women, Cook, Jelen and Wilcox (1992) demonstrate otherwise. If anything, men are 
slightly more likely to be supportive of abortion rights, but generally speaking, there is no 
significant difference. In addition to gender, Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox do not really find 
an effect for race. Despite the fact that on average, African-Americans are less likely to 
be supportive of abortion rights than whites, the authors point out that this difference is 
not inherent in race but is rather due to the social characteristics surrounding each race. 
For instance, African-Americans tend to be less educated and more religiously 
orthodox—two characteristics that contribute to less support for abortion rights. The 
authors conclude that if we compared white Evangelicals with only a high school 
education to African-Americans, there would be no difference in support for abortion 
policies. In fact, when the authors control for religious traditionalsm and education, they 




Geographic location, another social characteristic, also plays a role in predicting 
abortion attitudes for two reasons: (1) Like-minded people tend to cluster (O’Reilly & 
Webster, 1998; Gimpel, 2004); and (2) individuals raised in the South are exposed to 
social networks with particular cultural attitudes and therefore have more restrictive 
attitudes toward abortion rights (Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1992). 
Probably one of the most important social bases in the formation of abortion 
attitudes is age. As Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox (1992) point out, there are two different 
processes for how age could affect abortion attitudes and produce differences across age 
cohorts. The first looks at age as a “linear process”—the older an individual becomes the 
less likely they are to need abortion (this is true for both men and women.) The second is 
generational differences. Those who come of age during a certain period will develop 
different values and experiences and therefore develop different attitudes than another 
age cohort.  
 
3.5  Values and Attitudinal Bases for Abortion Attitudes 
Scholars have come back to two core values that—aside from gender equality—currently 
appear to play a role in predicting abortion attitudes across all groups: individualism and 
a type of Judeo-Christian morality (Jelen, 1984; Jelen, 1988; Cook et al.,1992; Jelen & 
Wilcox, 2002). Individualism is, as Wilcox and Jelen (2002) note, not only a core value, 
but it might be “the core value” (p. 494) in the American electorate. Given that the debate 
over abortion is whether a woman has the right to terminate a pregnancy, it is only natural 
that individualism plays such a strong role. Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox (1992) make the 




“Two diverse elements in American political culture lead to strong 
reactions by individuals to the abortion issue. First, is the American 
commitment to Lockean individualism, which provides that the freedom to 
do as one pleases is an important value. The philosopher Brian Berry has 
described an Anglo-American commitment to the “harm-principal” in 
which people are to be permitted to do as one pleases as long as they do 
not harm anyone else is an important value … A second element of 
American political culture is a tradition of private and civil re igion, with 
most people adhering to a somewhat vague Judeo-Christian values … In 
these cases the religious value may take precedence over the American 
commitment to individual liberties.” (p. 4) 
Judeo-Christian values are important because they contribute to belief about the 
start of life and acceptable sexual behavior- both important predictors of abortion 
attitudes. Some argue that allowing easy access to abortion is means of promoting (what 
some might view as) sexually permissive behavior. The debate over when life actually 
begins has recently come to dominate the abortion debate and has changed the framework 
to some degree from one of women’s rights to one of religion v. science. 
Ideology, best described as an individual’s world view, is an important pl yer in 
predicting attitudes toward every policy and subject area. Conservatives are less 
accepting of abortion rights, while liberals are more accepting. Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox 
(1992) describe the relationship between conservatives and restrictive attitudes toward 
abortion policy as one of nostalgia for a time when such issues were neither  permitted 




sordid matters” (p. 70). Liberals by definition, on the other hand, , take a more open and 
tolerant approach to new ideas and life styles.  
Finally, gender equality is also an attitude characteristic sometimes included in 
models of abortion attitudes, and as noted earlier, it is often usd by scholars as a proxy 
for gender attitudes (Wilcox, 1989; Rhodebeck, 1996, Emerson, 1996; Kaufmann & 
Petrocik, 1999). Recent literature, however, has seen mixed results when attempting to 
establish an empirical relationship between gender equality and abortion attitudes.  
 
3.6 Abortion Attitudes as Proxy for Gender Beliefs 
Given the very tangled stories of the women’s movement and abortion policy, 
various measures of attitudes toward abortion are often seen as an appropriate way to 
operationalize gender beliefs (or feminism) by many scholars (fo  example see: Wilcox, 
1989; Rhodebeck, 1996, Emerson, 1996; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999). Abortion 
attitudes have been used as a measure of feminist attitudes not only in the behavior/public 
opinion literature but in the institutional literature as well (see Swers, 2002).  
According to some scholars, there is a strong relationship between gender beliefs 
and abortion attitudes. Kristin Luker (1985) has argued that the abortion debate is very 
much driven by the gender debate at the elite level. Pro-choice act vists feel that abortion 
helps women control how they are seen as agents of reproduction, that by ving the 
freedom to control reproduction, women are freed from the proverbial chains of fertility. 
Women and men can now compete in the labor market. According to Luker, pro-life 
activists argue that women do not wish to be liberated from their essential natures as 




family structure. Jean Reith Schroedel (2000) also frames the abortion debate in terms of 
appropriate gender roles in the oft cited Is the Fetus a Person? Some research has found a 
statistical relationship between gender role attitudes and abortion at tudes (see Emerson, 
1996). 
Recently, however, gender beliefs have begun to be seen as a weak predictor of 
abortion attitudes (and vice versa) (Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1992; Jelen & Wilcox, 2002; 
Jelen, 2003). Although Cook, Jelen and Wilcox (1992) acknowledge the relationship 
between feminism and abortion at the elite level, they argue this connection does ot exist 
as strongly at the mass level; rather, attitudes toward sexual morality and individual 
liberty drive attitudes toward abortion. Jelen (2003) later establi hes that this holds true 
regardless of employment status and other categories.  
Wilcox, Cook, and Jelen (1992) are not the only scholars to treat abortion 
attitudes as conceptually distinct from gender beliefs.Heatherington and Weiler (2009) 
also treat abortion as a separate dimension from women’s rights (con isting of measures 
for the Equal Rights Admentment, feminism, and familial roles) in their new book 
exploring the origins and applications of authoritarianism in American politics. 
Both approaches to the relationship between gender beliefs and abortion are 
wrong because they are asking the wrong question. Often scholars focus on whether 
gender equality predicts abortion attitudes when they should be asking what aspects 
(beliefs) under the umbrella of gender equality affect abortion attitudes. Each approach 
conceptualizes gender beliefs as a fundamental, one-dimensional value which, in turn, 





Only one gender belief, which deals with the social primacy of m therhood and 
the evolving structure of the family, affects abortion attitudes. The remaining gender 
beliefs, because they are distinct, do not. Therefore, it is incorrect to treat abortion 
attitudes as representative of general gender equality, and it is equally incorrect to assume 
that there is no longer a significant relationship between gender beliefs and abortion 
attitudes. 
 
3.7 The Evidence 
As shown in Figure 3.5, there is no long-term change in abortion attitudes. The mean 
score for both men and women from 1980 to 2004 are almost exactly the same (around 
1.87 on a scale ranging from 0-4). On the other hand, as seen in Figure 3.4, there has been
a significant progressive shift in attitudes for both men and women when it comes to 
equal roles for women. Whereas the mean score for the overall populati n and abortion 
attitudes stayed relatively the same, there was a one unit increase for attitudes towards 
women’s role (scale ranging from 0-6).11  
The fact that the American public continues to develop more progressive gender 
beliefs but yet fails to do so with abortion attitudes suggests that, though related, abortion 
attitudes are not a straightforward byproduct of gender beliefs; they are instead a policy 
attitude developed by values such as individualism, characteristics such as religious 
traditionalism, and most importantly for this dissertation, beliefs about motherhood.  
 
                                                
11 Unfortunately, the seven point women’s role question is the only gender belief question that is 




Figure 3.4: Attitudes toward A Woman’s Place over Time 
             Source: Cumulative ANES. Note: Abortion variable ranges from 0-4 with the progressive    
response coded higher. 
 
Figure 3.5: Attitudes toward Abortion over Time 
 
                Source: Cumulative ANES. Note: Abortion variable ranges from 0-4 with the progressive     





To investigate the relationship between each gender beliefs and abortion attitudes, 
I rely on data from the 2008 ANES. This offers two benefits: (1) It is one of the more 
recent national data sets and therefore allows me to capture contemporary attitudes; and 
(2) it includes all of the same indicators for the gender beliefs used in earlier chapters 
(allowing for consistency throughout the dissertation). The primary independent variables 
of interests, gender beliefs, are each captured through a factor score. Because 
characteristics, such as religious traditionalism12, ideology, gender, individualism, and 
education, as described earlier, would potentially affect attitudes toward abortion, 
controls are included in the model (coding for all controls and the ep ndent variable are 
available in the appendix).  Finally, the dependent variable is measured using a four point 
scale ranging from always prohibited to always allow. Given the dependent variable is an 
ordered variable, ordered logit is the most appropriate statistical analysis.13   
 Table 3.1, below, shows the change in predicted probabilities for the statistically 
significant variables in the model (the full model is available in the appendix).  Though 
beliefs about women’s opportunities and beliefs about assertive women are statistically 
insignificant, beliefs about motherhood and family structure, proved statistic lly and 
substantively significant. As shown in Table 3.1, as you move from the minimum 
                                                
12 Religious traditionalism is serving as a proxy for Judeo-Christian values (which include 
attitudes to sexual morality as well as belief when life actually begins). 
13 Since the “old” abortion attitudes question was utilized in the ordered logit model, the sample 
size was greatly reduced given it was only asked of a few hundred respondents in the sample. 
After including the other necessary variables the sample is 382. While small, the sample size is 




(traditional) to the maximum (progressive) value on the motherhood beliefs factor score 
(a range from -2.7 to 1.9), the change in the predicted probability of choosing either 
always prohibit, only allow in cases of rape/incest/women’s health, to only when need 
has been established, or always allow as a matter of choice decreas s by 21% and 25%, 
and increases by 4% and 42%, respectively.  
   
 
Table 3.1: Change in Predicted Probability for Abortion Attitudes  
         Always Prohibited      2  3         Always Allowed 
Progressive belief                
About Motherhood   -21%  -25%   4%  42% 
 
Education                  -21%  -28%   2%  46% 
 
Religious Traditionalism  19%    26%  -1%  -44%  
 
Democrat                 -8%   -14%    1%   23% 
 
Liberal                           -17%                -26%     4%   44% 
 
Age      -8%  -16%    -1%   25% 
Source: 2008 ANES. Note all variables are coded with the progressive response as the highest value. 
 
  
 As we saw in Figures 3.1-3.3, presented earlier in the chapter, a plurality of 
Americans fall into the middle ‘conditional’ categories of abortion attitudes. Even here 
where one could argue, conceptually speaking, there are small differences between the 
categories, we see a large effect for motherhood beliefs between the two categ ries.14 
                                                
14 A model was also run with the dependent variable, attitudes toward abortion, coded as a three 
point scale with 0 representing always prohibit, the categories for permit in cases of rape, incest 





Moving from traditional to progressive on the motherhood belief score means th t the 
average individual is 25% less likely to only permit abortion in the cases of rape, incest 
and the mother’s health and 4% more likely to permit abortion in cases where a need has 
firmly been established—a 29% net difference. As activists wihin the abortion debate 
spend more time dealing with abortion regulations and abortion access and less time on 
general legality, this finding within the vague world of conditions ad circumstances has 
strong implications. 
The other statistically significant factors contributing to abortion attitudes—
religious traditionalism, party identification, age and ideology, education—are also 
included in the table. As religious traditionalism shifts from completely secular to 
traditional, the likelihood of the respondent choosing always prohibited increases by 
19%, and choosing always allowed is 44% less likely. Next, Democrats are 8% less likely 
to choose always prohibit abortion and 23% more likely to choose abortion should always 
be allowed when compared to a Republican. Ideology, alongside beliefs about 
motherhood, religious traditionalism and education, appear to be the stronge predictor 
of abortion attitudes, with liberals 17% less likely to choose always prohibited and 44% 
more likely to choose always allow when compared to conservatives. Moreover, younger 
                                                                                                                                                  
point on the scale and, finally, always prohibit as a matter of choice as the third point on the scale. 
There was no change with regards to significance in the model (Table A1 in the appendix) with 
the exception of whether the respondent considered themselves born again. Given the substantive 
difference in predicted probability of support of abortion depending on whether it was a case of 
rape, incest, or the woman’s health and when a needis firmly established I choose to present the 




individuals are 8% less likely to choose always prohibit and 25% more likely to always 
allow when compared to some of our oldest citizens. Finally, education, which has been 
found recently to be declining in influence (see Jelen and Wilcox’s 2003 review of 
scholarship on public opinion and abortion), comes back into play as a major predictor of 
abortion attitudes once beliefs about motherhood are included in the model. Those with a 
graduate degree are 21% less likely to choose always prohibit and a whopping 46% more 
likely to choose always a matter of choice.  
The substantive significance of motherhood beliefs is clear when compared to 
other factors that contribute to abortion attitudes. Beliefs about motherh od contribute 
more to predicting abortion attitudes than both age and party affiliation and hangs in there 
with ideology, religious traditionalism, and education. As demonstrated in Table 3.1, only 
religious traditionalism, ideology, and education are comparable in regard to the dramatic 
change in predicted probabilities across the abortion attitudes scale.  
 
3.8  The Social Primacy of Motherhood and its Effect on Abortion Attitudes 
The results presented in this chapter support Luker’s assertion that the social primacy of 
motherhood is a major player in the formation of abortion attitudes. This chapter, 
however, takes the investigation a step further and empirically demonstrates that the other 
two gender beliefs, beliefs about women’s opportunities and views on assertive women 
have no relationship with abortion attitudes for Americans.  
Kristin Luker’s classic investigation into abortion politics makes clear that the 
debate over the ‘social primacy’ of motherhood very much influences the debate over 




the ‘social primacy’ of motherhood takes a hit; therefore, abortion, allowing women 
control over whether they become a mother or not in the case of an unwanted pregnancy 
or a later decision to terminate for various other reasons, becomes a key battle in the war 
over the place of motherhood in a woman’s identity.  
It would be misleading or a blanket statment, however, to say that gender 
attitudes, or feminism, affect abortion attitudes. The results pre ented in this chapter 
make clear that is not the case. Only a particular predisposition under the umbrella of 
feminism affects abortion attitudes—beliefs about motherhood. Therefor, it would be 
incorrect to use abortion attitudes as a proxy for gender attitudes j st as it would be 
incorrect to completely dismiss a relationship between gender attitudes and abortion 
attitudes. 
 The findings of this chapter also have implications for a larger discussion about 
the debate over abortion and feminism. As the findings in this chapter demonstrate, the 
beliefs that cultivate and mold the electorate’s strongly held beiefs on abortion are 
distinct from feminist beliefs that mold their attitudes toward other gendered issues like 
women’s pay and sexual harassment. While the normative debate surrounding the 
appropriate relationship between feminism and abortion rages on, these findings suggest 
(and explain) that it is not inconsistent for an individual to hold traditional views on 
abortion attitudes, but yet progressive gender attitudes in other policy arenas as a result of 
the distinct gender beliefs. Keep in mind, as discussed in chapter two, different core 
values and personality characteristics influence gender beliefs. 
The findings in this chapter highlight the need for the literature o give gender 




with women in the workplace and women being just as capable as men, the belief about 
motherhood is still something that the electorate not only grapples with, but it also plays a 
role in the evaluations of woman candidates (as shown in Chapters Four and Five), as 








































The Curious Case of Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin,  







4.1  Introduction 
 
It was an early evening in September 2008 when Sarah Palin walked on stage at the 
Republican National Convention and accepted her place on the ticket as the Republican 
Party’s first woman Vice Presidential candidate. The offer to Palin, as some have 
speculated, was an attempt to capitalize on the disenfranchised woman supporters of 
Hillary Clinton, who had just watched her fight a hard battle and lose the democratic 
nomination to Barack Obama. The quick popularity of Sarah Palin among social 
conservatives was somewhat surprising given that historically her supporters have been 
characterized as anti-feminist. It had only been 16 years earlier when Marilyn Quayle 
stood on the same stage and asserted that "women do not wish to be liberated from their 
essential natures as women" (Matalyn, Carville, & Knobler, 1994 ). 
  “Sarah Palin Feminism” (Riley, 2008), “The Newer Feminism” (Cupp, 2008), 
“The Palin Puzzle” (Krauthammer, 2008), these are just a few of the headlines 




feminist. The emergence of Sarah Palin from social conservative groups presented 
political scientists with a puzzle: how to reconcile the popularity of a woman candidate 
among groups once thought of as holding traditional gender role attitudes.  
 While the success of both Clinton and Palin demonstrates a partial fulfillment of 
feminist goals, the community of public opinion scholars has been dealing with an 
antiquated and oversimplified conception of how Americans develop gender beliefs (as 
demonstrated in earlier chapters), which leaves us unable to explain certain political 
phenomena (as seen with Palin’s success) and inconsistent results in general (see Burns 
and Gallagher, 2010 for a review). In this chapter, I apply the three dimensions of gender 
beliefs introduced in chapter two to the 2008 evaluations of Sarah Palin and Hillary 
Clinton and then compare the results.  This chapter’s contributions to the literature are 
two-fold: (1) It provides further support that the dimensions of gender beli fs proposed in 
this dissertation influence evaluations of woman candidates in disti ct ways; and 2) that 
voters’ progressive belief about women’s opportunity produced higher ratings of Clinton 
and traditional views on motherhood produced higher ratings of Palin, which illuminates 
the nuances of the dynamics surrounding the 2008 candidates..  
 
4.2  The 2008 Election 
The popularity of both Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin left many within the punditry 
confused and unsure how to discuss the two candidates, particularly Palin, in the context 
of beliefs about gender and public opinion. The media and pundits seemed to agree that 
the presence of both Clinton and Palin would stir the proverbial pot when it came to 




polarizing effects. This was the case particularly for Palin, and even more so when 
compared to her male counterpart. She generated more distance between thos  who 
strongly supported and opposed her when compared to ratings of John McCain. 
 The historic 2008 election proves to be an optimal case study with a national 
sample to explore the relationship between gender beliefs and candidate evaluations 
because of the national prominence of two woman candidates from opposing arties and 
opposing ends of the ideological spectrum running during the same election. Not only do 
these two woman candidates differ in political backgrounds, they also h ve strikingly 
different social profiles that inevitably condition the effect of gender beliefs among sub-
groups. For instance, the younger Palin who is still actively parenting young children 
represents a different generation of women. More importantly, each campaign chose to 
approach the issue of gender differently, which eventually activated (or attempted to 
activate) gender beliefs in an advantageous way for each campaign. Ultimately, I will be 
unable to control or account for all of the nuances of differences between the candidates 
and campaign. The overall purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the distinct role that 
each gender belief played (or did not play) in ratings of Clinton and Palin in order to 
contribute to the larger argument of this dissertation and shed light on the mechanisms at 














Table 4.1: Average Post-Election Ratings of the 2008 Candidates  
   Democrat Women       Democrat Men        Republican Women       Republican Men         Independent Women         Independent Men 
 
Hillary Clinton  75.81         72.45           40.04                       34.59  57.93                 52.92 
 
Barack Obama 80.90         77.91           43.88        36.81  63.81             58.42 
 
John McCain     40.00         45.78                  70.94        68.47  54.32             51.71 
 
Sarah Palin              34.57                     37.96                  74.08                       70.17                     51.59                          49.50 
Source: ANES 2008 (sample contains whites only). 
Notes: Scale ranged from 0-100 with ratings closer to 100 representing warmer feelings. Only post-election ratings may be used for comparison. There is no pre-
election measure available for Sarah Palin. It is important to note that Clinton has a slight increase in average ratings from the pre-election measure to the post-
election measure. Because the literature has established the existence of a positivity bias with thermometer scores, a mean score was generated from the 
remaining group thermometer scores on the ANES and then subtracted from the thermometer score for eachc ndidate to create normalized scores (Wilcox, 




4. 3 Hillary Clinton  
Even before Hillary Rodham Clinton entered the political scene as a c ndidate for public 
office, she was viewed as a political figure challenging traditional gender roles. Breaking 
out of the “proper” role as First Lady during the Clinton Administration, she 
demonstrated unprecedented involvement in policy-making decisions. Focusing 
especially on areas regarding women‘s issues, Clinton led the taskforce to reform 
healthcare and worked on a variety of other policy projects. “She symbolized the 
increasing assertiveness and presence of career women whom many people, including 
men in elite, professional positions secretly or not so secretly fear and hate… .” (Skocpol, 
1997, p. 152-153 as quoted in Winter, 2006).  
 At the time of the election, Clinton, unlike Palin, had been a natio l figure for 
almost two decades. She is the only national woman figure who has consistently appeared 
on public opinion polls and remained in the public eye. The ups and downs of Clintn’s 
popularity can be attributed to: (1) her evolving role and image in the public eye from 
first lady, to senator, to the first woman to ever win a state presidential primary; and (2) 
to an electorate developing more progressive views toward gender.   
 Clinton has long been a public champion of the advancement of women. Though 
many public figures can make the same claim, over time Clinton has publicly (and 
consistently) spoken about or taken on issues dealing with women’s opportunities. She 
has done so on multiple platforms with many different audiences. In 1995,as First Lady, 
she traveled to Beijing, China, for the United Nation’s Fourth World Conference on 
Women where she famously declared, “If there is one message th t echoes from this 




human rights once and for all” (Clinton, 2003, p. 305). The media, constantly referring to 
Clinton’s efforts to champion modern-day women, supported this image. She continued 
to break the mold of First Lady by leading the task force to ref rm health care, as 
previously mentioned.  
 After leaving her role as First Lady, Clinton successfully ran for a New York 
Senate seat. Upon entering the Senate, contrary to what many pundits had predicted, 
Clinton assumed a less visible role as the junior senator from New York, which both 
quieted her image as a “radical feminist” and improved her appearance as a moderate. 
Nonetheless, she had left her mark on the minds of many Americans as a champion of the 
women’s movement. Her presence in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary has 
become somewhat symbolic of a generation of women defying traditional gender roles; 
therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Beliefs about women’s opportunities will affect evaluations of Hillary Clinton with       
       progressive beliefs producing higher ratings of Clinton. 
 
 
Although Clinton certainly did not reject her role as a mother and wife, it was not an 
identity associated with her political image—and in politics it’all about perception. 
More importantly, public comments, such as “I guess I could have stayd home and 
baked cookies,” intensified her image as a career-focused woman bucking traditional 
gender roles. On the one hand, this drew heavy criticism from many le ders within the 
social conservative community. On the other hand, this earned Clinton support and 




capitalize on the offending of this particular demographic—women with traditional 
approaches to motherhood. Women mobilized and often showed up in protest at Clin on 
events while wearing aprons and carrying roller pins to underline their frustration with 
what they perceived as a lack of respect for traditional mothers. For the past decade, 
however, Clinton has not received any (notable) media attention in regard to comments 
on motherhood. She has avoided the topic, and for that matter, the topic has avoided her.  
Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Beliefs about motherhood will affect evaluations of Clinton with traditional beliefs 
producing lower ratings of Clinton. 
 
H3: Though significant, beliefs about motherhood will maintain the lesser rol  compared 
to beliefs about women’s opportunities in ratings of Clinton—evident with a smaller 
coefficient. 
 
Even though Hillary Clinton has always brought attention to inequality f ced by women, 
particularly in politics, Clinton and her advisors made the choice to avoid discussing 
double standards within the media and challenges she faced as a woman running for 
office during the 2008 election for strategic purposes (Kornblut, 2009). Already, Clinton 
had faced criticism from the media after two decades of women’s advocacy for being too 
pushy. Conservative commentator Tucker Carlson once infamously claimed that when 
Clinton walks into a room he involuntarily crosses his legs (Media Matters 2007) and a 




“beat the bitch” (Condron 2007). The campaign, perhaps wanting to stay away from 
statements that may have made Clinton appear “whiny” or seeking special favor—for 
fear they would play into stereotypical negative images—never highlighted double 
standards, even when they were blatant within the media. For example, the media paid 
little attention to the benchmarks passed by the Clinton campaign in regard to women’s 
advancement. Anne Kornblut, Washington Post reporter who covered both the Obama 
and Clinton campaigns and author of Notes from the Cracked Ceiling: Hillary Clinton, 
Sarah Palin and What it Will Take for a Woman to Win, observed that when Barack 
Obama won the Iowa primary, the media went crazy with headlines noting the 
accomplishment for the African American community. Obama, however, was not the first 
African-American to win a presidential primary—Jesse Jackson was. When Clinton won 
the New Hampshire primary, she was the first woman ever to win a presidential primary, 
but the historical accomplishment went unremarked by the media. Advisors, concerned 
with overcoming prejudices that a woman would not be “tough” enough to run for office, 
did not want to remind voters that she was a woman and kept the main focus of the 
campaign on establishing Clinton as a resolved leader. The one time the Clinton 
campaign did point out an unfair occurrence due to Clinton’s gender—during an 
unsuccessful debate performance in Philadelphia in 2007, the rest of her opponents, all 
male, teamed up against her—backfired. She received bad press as a result and was 
deemed “whiny.” Her opponents declared that she was ganged up on because she was the 
front-runner, not because she was a woman (see Kornblut for a review, 2009). The 
Clinton campaign made strong efforts not to cue beliefs about asserive women; therefore 





H4: Beliefs about assertive women should play no role in 2008 ratings of Hillary Clinton.  
 
4.4 Sarah Palin 
Alaska Governor Sarah Palin stormed into the national scene during the 2008 Presidential 
election when she was introduced during the Republican nominating convention as the
first woman on a Republican ticket. Quick to set the right political im ge, she introduced 
herself to the world as the hockey mom from Alaska who stumbled into the limelight—
deflecting any attributes of ambition. For the most part, this image was accurate. Palin 
had begun her involvement through the city council in her hometown. She soon ran f r
mayor of Wasilla and went on to serve as the governor of Alaska before joining the 
national Republican ticket.  
 Though Palin does not have the history Clinton has of championing women’s 
rights and advancement, she is the first woman to ever serve as Governor of Alaska as 
well as the first woman to be nominated for Vice President on the Republican ticket. In 
addition, Palin was a star athlete while growing up in her hometown playing basketball. 
Her athletic competiveness is known to have landed her the nickname “Sarah Barracud ,” 
which was touted by both the campaign and media when building a background on her. 
Additionally, Palin, championing equality in funding and opportunities in boys and girls 
sports (although Title IX has much broader policy implications), herself has openly 






H5: Attitudes toward women’s opportunities affect evaluations of Sarah P lin with 
progressive attitudes toward women’s opportunities leading to higher ratings of Sarah 
Palin. 
 
 Unlike Clinton, who has been on the national stage for the last two decades, Palin 
was unfamiliar to most voters. Her role as a mother was immediately highlighted and 
kept up front and center for most of the campaign.  The media and Republican elites 
strengthened her maternal image by focusing attention on the recent birth of her fifth 
child, Trig. During Palin‘s pregnancy, it was discovered that Trig had Down‘s Syndrome. 
Much attention was paid to her choice to continue on with the pregnancy, which kept her 
role as a mother of five salient throughout the campaign. While questions were raised 
about her ability to raise her children and run for national office at the same time, 
surprisingly, they often came from opponents on the left and not the usual base of stay-at-
home mothers or social conservatives. Nevertheless, I suspect that: 
 
H6: Beliefs about motherhood affect ratings of Sarah Palin with progressive beliefs about 
motherhood producing higher ratings of Sarah Palin. 
 
 In 2008, when first asked if she would label herself a feminist during a major 
interview with Brian Williams on NBC Nightly News, Palin   said she would not, only to 
contradict herself later in the campaign. To complicate matters a little more, Palin (noted 
in the earlier quote) has stated in an interview, when asked about Clinton’s claims of 




attention to herself on that level.” Given Palin’s public comments ad disassociation with 
the feminist identity, it can be expected that Palin is seen as an alternative to assertive 
women; therefore, I hypothesize that:  
 
H7: Views toward assertive women affect ratings of Sarah Palin with traditional views 
toward assertive women leading to higher ratings of Sarah Palin.  
 
4.5  Data and Methods 
 The 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES), the most attractive dataset 
for this study, includes thermometer scores for both Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin 
immediately following the 2008 election. Both dependent variables, feeling thermometer 
scores for Clinton and Palin, are scaled from 0-100.15 It has been demonstrated that a 
positivity bias may exist when using raw thermometers scores (see Wilcox, Sigleman, & 
Cook, 1989). Therefore, to correct for this bias, a mean score was generated from the 
remaining group thermometer scores on the ANES and then subtracted from the 
thermometer score for Clinton and Palin to create normalized scores. Because both of the 
dependent variables are continuous, the appropriate statistical tool is OLS.  
 Americans sometimes hold contradicting viewpoints on gender equality; 
therefore, a single-item measure would be inadequate as demonstrated in Chapter Two. 
Again, as discussed in earlier chapters, there are three separate dimensions driving gender 
                                                
15 While some may argue, given her history as First Lady, that it would be difficult to disentangle 
ratings of Clinton from Bill Clinton, research has determined that public opinion of Clinton is 





values: belief about women’s opportunities, family structure and motherhood, and views 
on assertive women. Factor scores were generated for each dimension, recoded 0-1 for 
ease of interpretation, and included as the primary independent variables n the OLS 
model.16  
 Besides attitudes toward the different dimensions of feminism, other variables 
may theoretically affect evaluations of Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin; therefore, a set of 
control variables is included. Party identification, likely the most important predictor of 
evaluations of Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin, is included. It is made up of three 
categories: Republican, Independent, and Democrat. Socio-demographic variables that 
may also affect evaluations of Clinton and Palin are also included: age, educational 
attainment, income, whether or not you reside in the South, and religious traditionalism. 
The sample size for the Clinton model is 396 and the sample size for the Palin model is 
391 which is particularly low given the sample of whites in the ANES is at a little over a 
1,000 cases (who answered either of the dependent variables). The religious 
traditionalism index (more specifically the church attendance variable) appears to be 
pulling the sample down with  only 584 cases among the white sample. I choose to leave 
the index intact in the model given its theoretical importance in rat gs of both Palin and 
Clinton.  
                                                
16 All of the variables were coded so that the most progressive response has the higher value. See 




Table 4.2: The Effect of Gender Beliefs on Ratings of Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin 
     Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with s andard errors in parentheses. All variables have    
      been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor    
      scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpre ation.  
       Hillary Clinton         Sarah Palin 
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               R2=.414 
            N=391 




4.6  Analysis  
 
To test the effect of the feminist dimensions on candidate evaluations, we must first 
estimate the equation: 
 
Ratings= β + β1 relevant demographics + β2 beliefs about assertive women + β3 beliefs 
about motherhood + β4 beliefs about women’s opportunity + e. 
 
Table 4.2 presents the coefficient estimates of each model with robust standard errors. 
The sample size for the Clinton model is 396 respondents and 391 for the Palin model. 
As shown in Table 4.2, the only gender belief that predicts ratings of Hillary Clinton is 
beliefs about women’s opportunities, which confirms hypotheses 1. A positive one unit 
change in beliefs about women’s opportunities predicts slightly over a 15 point increase 
in ratings of Clinton. This is a very strong effect—particularly when compared to other 
factors. Ideology, also statistically significant in the model, only has a coefficient of 2.54. 
For every one unit change in ideology, ratings of Clinton only increase by a little over 2 
points. Ideology, as noted earlier, is measured on a seven point scale, which means that 
even the maximum shift, from very conservative to very liberal (a seven point shift) 
increases ratings of Clinton by 17.5 points—only somewhat higher than a one unit shift 
in belief about women’s opportunities (recoded to 0-1). Neither beliefs about motherhood 
nor beliefs about assertive women predict ratings of Clinton. The data do not support 
hypotheses 2 or 3, but do support hypothesis 4. In addition to both beliefs about women’s 
opportunities and ideology, partisanship, religious traditionalism and individualism are 




 Like the Clinton model, when we turn to the Palin model we see that only one 
gender belief predicts ratings of Palin; however, beliefs about women’s opportunities do 
not affect ratings of Palin. Beliefs about motherhood proved to be a strong predictor of 
ratings of Sarah Palin with traditional views on motherhood predicting higher ratings of 
Palin (which fails to confirm hypothesis 2 and 3). As shown in Table 4.2, a one unit 
change in beliefs about motherhood produces slightly over a 12 point change in ratings of 
Palin. In addition to beliefs about motherhood, partisanship, individualism, residency in 
the South, educational attainment, and sex affected ratings of Palin as well. The data do 
not support any of the hypotheses laid out earlier in regard to ratings of Palin.  
 Given the prominent role partisanship plays in candidate evaluations (see 
Campbell Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960), it is important to include a control for party 
identification in both models. As shown in Table 4.2, partisanship does indeed play a 
major role in ratings of Clinton and Palin as expected. A one unit change in party 
identification (coded as a three point measure from Republican, to Independent, to 
Democrat with Democrat represented by the higher value) leads to an almost 11 point 
increase in ratings of Clinton, and a one unit change in partisanship leads to an almost 9 
point decrease in support for Palin. Given the prominent role partisanship plays in 
candidate evaluations and the unique relationship each party has with the wom n’s 
movement, it is expected that partisanship conditions the effect of gender beliefs on 
ratings of each candidate. The equation was modified to explore any potential interactive 





Ratings= β + β1 relevant demographics + β2 Party Identification + β3 belief about 
women’s opportunity + β4 beliefs about assertive women + β5 beliefs about motherhood 
+ gender belief * party identification + e. 
 
 As shown in Table 4.3, the expectation that party identification conditi s gender 
beliefs’ influence on candidate ratings is not completely represnt d in the data. 
Partisanship does not condition gender beliefs’ effect on evaluations of Sarah Palin at all. 
Not one of the interactive terms or constitutive terms is statistically significant. There is 
some interaction effect, however, between gender beliefs and party identification for 
Hillary Clinton. As shown in Table 4.3, progressive views toward assertive women 
matter more for Republican ratings of Hillary Clinton when compared to Democrat 
ratings; Republicans holding progressive views on assertive women are likely to rate 
Clinton higher and vice versa. A one unit positive change in belief about assertive women 
translates into an almost 16 point increase in ratings of Clinton among Republicans. Even 
though beliefs about women’s opportunities matter for the general electorate’s 
evaluations of Clinton, beliefs about assertive women matter for Republicans’ ratings of 
Clinton. Also of note in Table 4.3, for individuals who are traditional in all three realms 
of gender beliefs, partisanship matters with anti-feminist Democrats and Independents 



























Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables have 
been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor scores 
have been recoded 0-1.  





























































































































4.7  The New Mommy Wars? 
It's the Mommy Wars: Special Campaign Edition. But this time the battle 
lines are drawn inside out, with social conservatives, usually staunch 
advocates for stay-at-home motherhood, mostly defending her [Palin], 
while some others, including plenty of working mothers, worry that she is 
taking on too much.(Kantor & Swarns, New York Times, 2008) 
 The results presented in Table 4.2 support the claim that Palin received support 
from an unlikely source: voters with traditional views on motherhood. At first glance, this 
finding appears counter-intuitive. Campaigning for one of the most powerful positions in 
the nation, Palin, a mother of five, violated the norms of motherhood. However, Palin did 
not experience the wrath of the voters who hold traditional views on motherhood; she 
garnered their support.  
 Although Palin campaigned outside the house, she very much included 
motherhood into her political identity. She introduced herself to the nation s a hockey 
mom, was often seen campaigning with her children, and it is worth n ting that she has a 
large number of children (five), which is higher than the national average. Perhaps the 
“mommy wars” has moved beyond whether mothers should work outside the home or 
not; rather, the focus has shifted to the social primacy of motherhood (see Luker 1985), 
and given Palin’s strong identification with motherhood, she never violated the gendered 
social norms. Though Clinton is also a mother, this was not an identity that she 
incorporated into her political identity; therefore, she was neither penalized nor rewarded 
by beliefs on motherhood. It simply was not salient issue in the cas of Clinton. The role 





4.8 “How do you explain Sarah Palin?” 
When studying women and politics, particularly gender attitudes within the mass 
electorate, it is inevitable that one will be asked, “So, how do you explain Sarah Palin?” 
This comes as no surprise given that the phenomenon of a woman becoming quite 
popular among a subset of the electorate often associated with tradition l views on 
gender has captured the attention of the country. Political scientists, perhaps, would be 
quick to point to party affiliation as the answer—strong party ties s mply trump anti-
feminist beliefs that could potentially affect her popularity; however, this is simply not 
born out in the data. If party affiliation drove her popularity among socially conservative 
groups, then measures of gender beliefs should have no effect at all. We know, however, 
that they do, specifically beliefs about motherhood do. It was not that Palin proved 
popular in spite of traditional gender views, it was that she was popular partly because of 























              
             
              
         Source: 2008 National Election Studies Note: All entries are OLS coefficients.  












Household income .353 
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Source: 2008 National Election Studies Note: All entri s are OLS coefficients. 












Household income .336 
(.308) 
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4. 9 Implications 
 
 
 Most importantly, the results from the Clinton and Palin models highlight the 
importance and need to account for each gender belief—particularly in elections that 
involve woman candidates. Had I relied on measures that tapped into beliefs about 
women’s opportunities or views on assertive women, I would have incorrectly concluded 
that views on gender equality played no role in this historic candidacy as demonstrated in 
Tables 4.4 and Table 4.5. We know, however, that is not the case. While the more 
traditional approach, measuring beliefs about women’s opportunities (primarily dealing 
with discrimination), plays no role in evaluations of Palin, belief about motherhood does. 
As we see, the story is slightly more nuanced than past conceptions of feminism 
(conceptions of feminism within the public opinion literature) or gender beliefs would 
have accounted for. 
 The findings presented in this chapter have important implications for woman 
candidates and the role gender values play in political assessments. Even in the very same 
national election, different gender values were cued depending on the candidate. Though 
the findings from the 2008 case study are enlightening and provide some insight into a 
historic year for women and politics, future work should focus on experimental situations 
to control for idiosyncrasies associated with particular elections. The following chapter 
will further explore the relationship between traditional motherhood beliefs and woman 
candidate evaluations. I will test my suspicion that woman candidates who do not 
conform to traditional gender norms in regards to motherhood actually cue traditional 
motherhood beliefs, and woman candidates who clearly establish the primacy of 






The Mommy Wars: an Experimental  




5.1  Introduction 
When 2010 congressional candidate Krystal Marie Ball (VA-1) first sought out advisors 
within the campaign world, one told her, "Krystal, I've got two pieces of advice for you: 
Cut your hair and stop talking about your kid.  No one cares” (as reported in an August 
2010 newsletter from the Ball campaign). While some woman candid tes have been 
advised to play down certain feminine characteristics of their personal profile, in this case 
motherhood, others have played them up. The “grizzly mom” slogan has been growi g in 
popularity among Republican women who are also mothers. Moreover, Senator Patty 
Murray made a lasting impression with her “mom in tennis shoes” campaign.   
 Perhaps the political consultants are on to something: The idea that the gendered 
characteristics of women cue certain gender beliefs to be taken into consideration when 
assessing the candidate. Whether to play them up or down depends on the audience she is 
reaching out to. Recent research demonstrates that the social prof le of a candidate 
significantly matters, even when partisanship is taken into consideration (Miller, 
Wlezien, & Hildreth, 1991; Green, Palmquist, & Shickler, 2002; Campbell, Green, & 




 We see in Chapter Four, certain gender beliefs play a role in 2008 ratings of 
former vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin, but different gender beli fs play a role in 
ratings of former presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Why is thi ? The answer is that 
gender beliefs exist among a sea of group identities, beliefs, and attitudes, and when they 
matter, like many things in politics, depends on the mixture of cues and context. We see 
in Chapter Four that, despite the intense media buzz about the ‘mommy wars,’ beliefs 
about motherhood were not a major factor in post-election ratings of Clinton or Palin. 
This chapter will more closely investigate the relationship betwe n the social profiles of 
woman candidates and voters’ views on motherhood.  
 
5.2  Gender Bias in Candidate Evaluations: Indirect and Direct Bias 
 
5.2.1 Indirect Bias: Gender Stereotypes regarding Gender Beliefs and Gender Traits 
 
It is not uncommon for voters to utilize stereotypes when evaluating candidates. 
Stereotypes often act as an information shortcut in a world overflowing ith information 
and pressed for time. Just like party identification, the background and profile of a 
candidate acts as a heuristic for voters (Stokes & Miller, 1962; Popkin, 1991). Much 
work has been done demonstrating the impact of a candidate’s gender, race, and religion 
on voters’ assessment and support (Citrin, Green, & Sears, 1990; Carsey, 1995; Koch, 
2000; Dolan, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Campbell, Green, & Layman, 2010). 
Voters rely on gender to make inferences about the candidate’s traits, ideological 




Koch, 2000; Dolan, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2002). Voters assume woman candidates are 
more liberal than male candidates (Alexander & Anderson, 1993; Huddy & Terkildsen, 
1993) and more capable of handling “compassion” issues (such as poverty, childcare and 
healthcare); whereas male candidates are assumed to be more capable t dealing with 
issues regarding defense and foreign policy (Alexander & Anderson, 1993; Huddy & 
Terkildsen, 1993; Koch, 1999).  
Subsequent research has recognized that the party affiliation of the candidate 
conditions the application of gender stereotypes (see Dolan & Sanbonmatsu, 2009; 
Matland & King, 2003; Koch, 2002). Koch (2002) found that gender stereotypes 
associated with Democratic woman candidates increased distance betw en the candidate 
and voter, whereas gender stereotypes actually decreased distance betw en the 
Republican woman candidates and voters.  Matland and King (2003) found, however, 
that Republican women were often seen as more ideologically liberal when compared to 
Republican men; therefore, the former suffer more within their own party from gender 
stereotyping but benefit from Democratic and Independent voters.  
The study of gender stereotypes is important because it not only sheds light on 
how voters view woman candidates, but also on how woman candidates, as a result, run 
their campaign (Herrnson, Lay, & Stokes, 2008; but see Dolan, 2005) and subsequently, 
how men run their campaign in response (Fox, 1997). Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes (2008) 
found that women are more successful when they run “as women.” In other words, by 
running on and focusing on “woman” issues like healthcare and education, women gain 
an advantage. Gender stereotypes are not necessarily a detriment for some women in 




are assumed to be better at compassion issues, they are going to run on compassion 
issues.This activity is sometimes referred to as “gendered adaptiveness” (Banwart & 
McKinney, 2005). Yet, Dolan (2005) found that when looking at elections across the 
country, women tend to focus on the issues at hand and do not strategically attempt to 
focus only on issues that benefit woman candidates. 
5.2.2 Direct Bias: Gender Beliefs and Support for Women 
Generally speaking, the academic consensus is that direct gender bias plays little to no 
role in the evaluations of woman candidates (Burrell, 1996; Chaney & Sinclair, 1994; 
Ekstrand & Eckert, 1981; Sapiro, 1981-1982; Matland & King, 2002), and the focus of 
recent research has been on indirect voter bias or institutional bias. Relying on a standard 
measure which has appeared repeatedly on the ANES, scholars have seen the percent of 
Americans willing to vote for a woman president improve dramatically. In fact, the 
percentage of Americans who would be unwilling to vote for a woman president has 
dropped from 20% in the 70s to 9% in 1993 (Shrieber, 1978; Fox & Smith, 1998).  
 While much of the literature tends to dimiss explicit voter biasand instead focus 
on the effects of gender on trait and issue inferences (Alexander & Anderson, 1993; 
Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Koch, 1999), Fox and Smith (2002) argue that the li erature 
has moved on too quickly. They observe that previous work focuses on sub-sample  of 
the population within one region and therefore fails to take into account the attitudes of 
certain regions or groups. In addition, Streb, Burrell, Frederick, and Genovese (2008) 
look at the measures used to asses direct bias, specifically the oft used measure on the 
ANES that asks whether respondents would be willing to “vote for a woman for 




employing a list measure, they find that 26% of the electorate is “angry” at the prospect 
of a woman president.  
 Most importantly, for this study, previous work on gender bias simply assumes 
direct bias take place in the context of ‘sex’ and fails to really consider ‘gender.’ As 
Kathleen Dolan (2004) points out in Voting for Women: How the Public Evaluates 
Women Candidates: 
…we must also consider the differences between the terms sex and 
gender. While these terms are often used interchangeably, I would arg e
that doing so conflates two different considerations. While sex refers to 
biological distinctions between woman and male, gender is a more 
complex and socially constructed reference to the categories “feminine” 
and “masculine.” Gender involves ideas about the behaviors, roles, and 
activities that are considered feminine and masculine as well as beliefs 
about which people (women or men) appropriately occupy those spaces. 
(p. 7) 
It would be wrong to assume all women candidates are created equal in regard to gender, 
and it is this variation in gender where gender bias may affect political decision making 
and evaluations. In other words, how a woman candidate presents herself r garding 
children, career, and other traits that may or may not make her appear more or less 







 5.3  The ‘Mommy Wars’ and Gender Norms  
Feminist scholars have grappled with the subject of motherhood and familyor decades. 
Even Betty Friedan, famed feminist, was critical of her own seminal work the Feminine 
Mystique (1963) in a later publication, The Second Stage (1981), for being too “anti-
family” (Snitow, 1992). From cries of oppressive pronatalism from feminists to 
accusations of detrimental effects on the family from the anti-fem nists, the debate over 
the role of motherhood has clearly seeped into the electorate and fallen somewhat along 
the existing cultural divide. As we see in Figures 1 and 2, respondents who identify as 
Republicans were less likely to hold progressive views toward motherh od when 
compared to respondents who identified as Democrats. Whereas most Democrats fall on 
the most progressive response on the ‘motherhood’ index, the largest distribution of 
Republicans fell right in the middle of the index.  
The ‘mommy wars’ is more than the battles over the merits of having children v. 
not having children or working mothers v. stay-at-home mothers; rather, it is often about 
a woman’s social identity and the importance of motherhood or gender norms. Social 
identity theory is a social psychological theory that is often used by political scientists to 
help explain public opinion and political behavior. Social identity theory posits that 
“social identity is derived from an individual’s self-categorization, the process by which 
the individual cognitively redefines the self in terms of group norms and the associated 
stereotypes of particular social categories” (Monroe, Hankin and Van Vechten 2000 
p.434). The self-categorization theory, an extension of social identity theory, relies on 
group prototypes. The more individuals see themselves like the socially onstructed 




woman, the more individuals will see themselves as part of that group—regardless of 
their personal situation.  
Wilcox (1991) found that working Evangelical women maintained their social 
identity as homemakers, even after they entered the workforce. Though participation in 
the workforce usually leads to more egalitarian gender roles for women, Wilcox found 
that was not the case for Evangelical women because of the their srong social 
identification as homemakers. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a woman 
candidate who (although technically working) could still present herself in such a way 
that it does not violate the social identity of homemaker or violate any traditional gender 
norms. For instance, Phyllis Schlafly, a prominent advocate of mothers staying at home, 
ironically, worked outside the home campaigning for the cause. Schlafly successfully 
incorporated motherhood into her social identity and therefore became sybolic of 
traditional views on motherhood. 
 In Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood Kristin Luker (1984) makes the 
argument that the debate over abortion is driven by views on when life begins, but it also, 
for women, very much taps into an ongoing debate over the importance of motherhood in 
their identity. As Luker tell us: “Women who oppose abortion and wish to make it 
officially unavailable, are declaring both practically and symbolically, that women’s 
reproductive roles should be given social primacy … the act of conception therefore 
creates a pregnant woman; rather than a woman who is pregnant” (p. 200). A woman 
who has chosen not to have children may violate certain norms, not only about f mily, 
but about womanhood as well. As Luker points out, the more women succeed in th  male 




Therefore, a woman candidate with no children may subconsciously appear as a threat to 
the identity and values of some men and women. 
 
5.4 Priming, Beliefs about Motherhood, and Political Choices 
 
 Within this chapter, I argue that the social profile of a woman c ndidate, 
specifically her marital status and role as a mother (or lack thereof), activate gender 
beliefs during the candidate evaluation process. To help build my theoretical case, I 
borrow slightly from the race and politics literature on cues and priming, specifically 
from Mendelberg’s (2001) theoretical approach to racial priming. Mendelberg (2001) 
argues that racial cues make racial attitudes more accessible in memory and therefore are 
employed during political decisions. Valentino, Hutchings, and White (2002) also find 
support for the argument that racial cues increase accessibility to racial schemas. This 
same approach is applicable to gender attitudes and women: that particular gender cues 
makes gender attitudes more accessible in memory, and they are therefore employed 
during the decision process.  
Gender beliefs exist among a sea of attitudes, group associations, nd emotions 
within the average voter, and they are not always employed during the evaluation 
process. I propose that certain cues, in this case the social profle of a woman candidate, 
prime gender beliefs to be taken into consideration when evaluating a woman candidate. 
Given the theoretical proposition that woman candidates who violate traditional gender 





H1: When women candidates violate gender role norms and voters are awar of this 
violation, motherhood beliefs become salient in the evaluative process. 
H2: When women candidates violate gender role norms and this violation is made salient, 
voters with conservative motherhood beliefs will be less approving than voters who hold 
progressive beliefs.  
H3: Women candidates who conform to traditional gender roles (e.g., married mothers) 
will not typically prime motherhood beliefs as a consideration in the evaluative process.  
 
5.5  The Experiment 
 
This study utilizes data from an original survey experiment colle ted through the 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study, an online national stratified survey conducted 
in the fall of 2010 by Polimetrix. The study surveyed 30,000 respondents and w s 
conducted in two waves: The first wave, the pre-election wave, was administered prior to 
the 2010 election during three time periods: late September, middle October, and late 
October. The second wave, the post-election wave, was administered immediately 
following the 2010 elections. The experiment was designed to isolate the effects of 
motherhood on support for hypothetical female candidates.  
 The first wave of the online study asked respondents two questions dealing with 
motherhood and the evolving nature of the family. Beliefs about motherhood and the 
evolving family structure were captured using two of the original three measures 
presented in Chapter Two.17 The first measure posed the following statement to 
respondents: “It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever and the 
                                                




woman takes care of the home and family.”18 Respondents were then asked whether they 
agreed, disagreed, or neither agreed nor disagreed.  The second measure posed this 
statement to respondents: “Working mothers can establish just as warm and secure a 
relationship with their children as a mother who does not work.” Respondents were then 
asked whether they agreed, disagreed, or neither agreed nor disagreed.  I created the 
“Motherhood Beliefs” measure by constructing an additive index of these questions that 
ranges from 0 to 4. The distribution of the Motherhood Beliefs Measure i  presented in 
Figure 5.1.  As evident from the distribution, beliefs are somewhat skewed toward the 
liberal end of the scale.  Approximately half of the sample scored below 3, with the other 
half scoring 3 and above.   
 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of Motherhood Beliefs 
 
Notes: Data labels are the percentage of the sample who score in the respective category. Motherhood 
Beliefs scale is scored from conservative to liberal.   n=330   Source: 2010 CCES 
 
                                                




The second phase of the online study was administered to the same group of espondents 
after the 2010 election with anywhere from one to eight weeks in between (depending on 
when the respondent was administered the first wave). In the second phase, respondents 
received a description of a hypothetical woman congressional candidate. As shown in 
Table 5.1, there were two possible treatments in addition to one control. The first 
treatment presents a woman candidate and explicitly mentions that he is married with 
children. The second treatment presents a woman candidate and explicitly men ions that 
she is not married, has no children, and is devoted to her work. The final treatment, the 
control, presents a woman candidate with no explicit mention either way reg rding the 
candidate’s marital status and whether she has children or not. With the exception of the 
manipulation, the description of the candidate’s role as a mother and wife, the rest of the 
description presented a qualified candidate with no mention of partisan affiliation or issue 
stance.19  
Since there was a time period of at least one week or more between the two 
phases of the survey, I can be confident that the first phase, which measured gender 
beliefs, was not priming these values to be taken into consideration during the candidate 
evaluation. In other words, the act of answering the questions on beliefs about 
motherhood is not itself priming the belief, but the cues in each treatment are doing the 
priming. After receiving the treatment, respondents were instructed: We'd like to get your 
feelings toward Amy Smith. Please rate her on something we call the feeling 
thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable 
                                                
19 While the randomization of the experimental design was largely successful and does not necessitate my 
including the control variables to correct for sampling errors, I include controls in the models to establish 





and warm toward her. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't 
care much for her. Ratings of 50 mean that you don't feel particularly warm or cold 
toward her. Please see Table 5.1 for the description of each treatment. 
5.6  Data & Analysis 
Table 5.1: Description of Treatment 
Treatment A Amy Smith, a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, is a 
successful businesswoman. Amy graduated cum laude from a top 
university with a degree in business and politics. She is happily married 
and has three children.  Amy was elected five years ago to serve on the 
city council. She is moderate politically and has worked with people 
from both parties.  
Treatment B Amy Smith, a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, is a 
successful businesswoman. Amy graduated cum laude from a top 
university with a degree in business and politics. She is not married, has 
no children, and is devoted to her work.  Amy was elected five years ago 
to serve on the city council. She is moderate politically and has worked 
with people from both parties.  
Control  Amy Smith, a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, is a 
successful businesswoman. Amy graduated cum laude from a top 
university with a degree in business and politics. Amy was elected five 
years ago to serve on the city council. She is moderate politically and has 
worked with people from both parties. 
 
  
Table 5.2 presents the results from the model. Given that the dependent variable, 
thermometer score ratings of the hypothetical congressional cadidate Amy Smith, is a 
continuous variable, OLS is the appropriate statistical model. Overall, the model has a 
sample size of 234 respondents. Each treatment variable is coded so that the treatment=1 
and the comparison group, in this case the control treatment and the other treatment, =0. 
For example, Treatment A is coded so that 1= all those who received treatment and 0 = 




98 respondents with a mean score of 61, treatment B has 117 respondents with a mean 
score of 63, and the control group has 116 respondents with a mean score of 61.  
 The primary independent variable, beliefs about motherhood, is an index score 
ranging from 0-5. It was created from the two questions administered on the first wave of 
the experiment dealing with beliefs about motherhood. An interaction term was created 
for each treatment, treatment A and treatment B, with motherhood so that I may test the 
conditioning effect of each treatment on the relationship between beliefs about 
motherhood and candidate evaluations.  
 In addition to the primary variables of interest, there are oth r factors that can be 
expected to affect the evaluations of woman candidates, such as: age, gender, education, 
family income, partisan identification, ideology, race, and finally, religious 
traditionalism. Each was included as a control variable in the model.20 Age, naturally, 
represents the generational cohort of the respondent. Older respondents grew up and 
raised families during a time period where women were valued more as mothers and were 
less prevalent in politics and leadership positions in general, and therefore, it is included 
in the model. It is important to include education because past research has shown that 
education produces more egalitarian views in general. Past research shows that citizens 
sometimes infer partisanship or ideological leanings from gender; th efore, it was 
critical to include because respondents in the experiment were rating a woman candidate. 
Finally, religious traditionalism is included in the model given the tenuous relationship 
between religion and the women’s movement suggests the more religious a respondent 
the lower that respondent may rank a woman candidate—particularly one who is not a 
mother (see Leege, Wald, Krueger, & Mueller, 2002). 
                                                

















































Notes: Dependent Variable is the feeling thermometer scoe f r the hypothetical candidate (0 to 100). 
Sample includes respondents from Treatment A, Treatm nt B and the control group.          
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The interaction between beliefs about motherhood and the second treatment, treatment B, 
however, is statistically significant with a coefficient of 10.10. For every one unit 
increase on the motherhood scale, ratings of the hypothetical candidate Amy Smith, who 
was not married and does not have children, improved by 10.10 points. Conversely, for 
every one unit decrease on the motherhood index, scale ratings of Amy Smith dropped by 
10.10 points. Substantively, as seen in Figure 5.2, this finding is significant.  
As we can see from the constituent term included in the model, treatment B, 
which is also statistically significant, the strongest effect is for men and women with very 
traditional beliefs about motherhood. In other words, for individuals who scored 0 on the 
motherhood index and thereby hold very traditional views on motherhood, the description 
of a woman candidate with no husband or children is likely to produce significantly lower 
ratings.  
This finding holds even after controlling for age, ideology, partisan ide t fication, 
education, income, race, and even religious traditionalism. According to Table 5.2, a 
woman candidate who is not married and has no children triggers beliefs about the 
evolving role of motherhood within the electorate. Men and women who hold progressive 
views in the domain of motherhood are likely to rate a woman candidate high r, and men 
and women who hold traditional views about motherhood are much more likely to rate a 
woman candidate who is not married and has no children significantly lower compared to 
the base category (no mention of children or marriage either way).  The findings from 








5.8   Implications  
 
 The results of this study are clear: American citizens’ beliefs about motherhood 
play an important role when evaluating woman candidates who did not choose t e more 
traditional route of marriage and children. Men and women with progressive views 
toward the changing dynamic of the family are more likely to rate a childless woman 
candidate higher, whereas men and women with traditional views toward motherhood 
and the changing family dynamic are much more likely to ratea childless woman 
candidate lower. In fact, it is the latter of the two driving the results with a substantively 
large coefficient.  




Notes: The predicted marginal effect of Treatment B as conditioned by Motherhood Beliefs (0 to 4) was 





 While a childless woman candidate cues beliefs about motherhood during the 
evaluation process, beliefs about motherhood do not come into play when evaluating a 
woman candidate who is married with children. I attribute this finding to the fact that a 
mother who is running for office does not necessarily violate any ge der norms or offend 
social identities in the same way. She maintains motherhood as a key component of her 
social identity and thus does not violate the social primacy of motherhood. Even though 
she is running for office, she does not violate the views of progressive men and women in 
terms of beliefs about motherhood. As a result of not violating anyone’s norms, beliefs 
about motherhood are never cued. The findings from this study are important and two-
fold: (1) Certain characteristics of a woman candidate’s social profile activate gender 
beliefs to be taken into consideration during the evaluation process; and (2) woman 
candidates with no children, as demonstrated from the findings, are dis dvantaged among 
more traditional groups within the citizenry.  
The literature on direct gender bias would benefit from readdressing the topic of 
gender role attitudes’ effect on support for woman candidates. Instead of approaching 
gender beliefs as a one-dimensional, linear belief, breaking gender beli fs into different 
topic clusters allows for the field to understand the nuances of gender beli fs and their 
effect on political choices. A woman candidate’s social profile is not limited to her 
marital status or children, and there are other characteristics that contribute to the social 
construction of gender—future research should continue to explore gender beliefs in 






5.9  Conclusion 
 As women continue to be underrepresented in the U.S. House and Senate, not to 
mention numerous state legislatures, it is imperative that scholars continue to explore the 
factors that may affect citizen’s evaluations of woman candidates. By limiting analyses to 
the differences between male and female candidates in terms of biological sex, scholars 
have overlooked a critical gap in the literature dealing with gender (the social c nstruct of 
what it means to be a woman). Whether a woman candidate does or does not have 
children not only activates gender beliefs but in some cases has a negative effect on 
evaluations and therefore limit her chances for success. This is part cularly troublesome 
for woman candidates running in conservative parts of the country. Findings from this 
study have implications for how women should run their campaigns as well as 
implications for broader discussions about contemporary women and their oppo tunities 









Gender Beliefs and Partisanship: The (lack of) Relationship 





In this dissertation we have explored the relationship between the three dimensions of 
gender beliefs, candidate evaluations (both experimental and the 2008 election), and 
reproductive policy—specifically abortion attitudes. This dissertation would be severely 
lacking if I did not touch on one of the most important, if not the most significant, factor 
within political behavior and public opinion: partisanship. To what extent does each 
dimension of gender beliefs affect the American public’s relationship with the two 
political parties is a question left unanswered by most of the existing literatur . In an 
environment where voters are overwhelmed with policy preferences and social 
attachments to either party, do the dimensions even matter? And if so, which ones? Why? 
These are a few of the questions I attempt to answer in this chapter. 
 
6.2 Literature Review & Expectations 
 
The American Voter (Campbell Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960) tells the story 
of detached voters not really involved in political life, and unsophisticated ones unable to 




term psychological commitments to a political party. The psychological attachment of the 
individual is very important to the Michigan model.  
“Few factors are of greater importance for our national elections than the 
lasting attachments of tens of millions of Americans to one of the parties. 
These loyalties establish a basic division of the electoral strength within 
the competition of particular campaigns take place … Most Americans 
have this sense of attachment with one party or the other. And for the 
individual who does, the strength and direction of party identification are 
facts of central importance in accounting for attitudes and behavior.” 
(Campbell Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960, p. 121) 
According to The American Voter, party identification (ID) remains stable, and 
when there is change, it is a gradual one that occurs over the span of an individual’s life. 
Formed early in life, party ID tends to resist change. Partisanship does much more than 
guide an individual’s vote choice; it informs the way a person receiv s and retains 
information. It affects how the individual views the political world. For example, Leah, 
born and raised in a Republican household in the South saw herself as a Republican early 
in life, and this has influenced the way she receives information on the Iraq war. She is 
more likely to have processed the 2008 troop surge in Iraq as a succes  and disregard 
commentators’ concern with its long-term success. According to The American Voter, 
“Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends 
to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more 
exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be” (Campbell, 




Although scholars have traditionally treated party ID as a long-standing 
psychological attachment, a “revisionist” school treated party ident fication as a product 
of retrospective evaluations and issues (see Fiorina, 1981; Franklin & Jackson, 1983; 
MacKuen, Erickson, & Stimson, 1989; Neimi & Jennings, 1991). Because the 
“traditional” school, prompted by the American Voter (1960), accepted that party ID 
shapes opinions and attitudes, politics was assumed to have little effect on the stability of 
party ID. The “revisionist” school, on the other hand, does see partisanship a  being 
affected by politics and policy preferences.  
The revisionist school began to appear in the late 70s. Of particular impo tance to 
the movement was Morris Fiorina’s Retrospective Voting in American National Elections 
(1981). Fiorina introduced the concept of the “running tally” as an interpretation of party 
ID that saw it as an endogenous factor, affected by issue positions and political 
evaluations. How we view the parties continually shifts, hence the nam  “running tally.” 
This approach, also referred to as the online processing model, is not a complete 180 in 
regards to understanding party ID as it was traditionally understood. Though Fiorina 
argues that issues and evaluations affect party ID, he also observes that it is not a 
completely unstable construct that changes with the political breezes as one might 
initially interpret. Because previous party ID does influence what information we receive 
and its interpretation, party ID often serves to simply re-enforce partisanship. 
Chris Achen (1992) builds off of the retrospective model with the Bayesi n 
approach. Achen claims that party ID cannot be modeled through linear equations 
because age mediates how political events affect partisanship. For example, a twenty-




the GOP had been receiving and the low approval ratings of President Bush than a 50 
year-old Republican who has seen, as a result of her age, the success of the Gulf war and 
a popular Republican president, like Reagan.   
Just as Achen (1992) modified the retrospective model, Green, Palmquist and 
Schickler (2002) along with Layman and Carsey (2006) have updated and built upon the 
Michigan model. Green, Palmquist and Shickler’s Partisan Hearts and Minds provides a 
thorough and convincing argument that party ID essentially boils down to identity—a 
“psychological process of self-categorization and group evaluation” (p. 13). In others 
words, voters associate with the political party made up of social groups they identify 
with. For any type of significant change to occur, there would need to be a substantial 
change in what groups the electorate associates with each party.  
Layman and Carsey’s (2006) findings provide support for the argument that 
individuals move their policy preferences to align with their political affilition on issues 
that are not important, but where the respondent is aware and perceives parties have taken 
a clear stance. They also found evidence suggesting that individuals move their party 
affiliation to meet their policy preferences on issues that are both salient and where the 
individual is aware the parties have taken clear, distinctive stands. “In short, party 
identification is a prime mover of other political attitudes under typical conditi s, but it 
is not an unmoved mover in all circumstances…It is only individuals who are aware of 
distinctions between the parties and placed considerable importance on the issue who 
should be likely to change their party identifications based on their policy preferences” 




position on a gender issue important to American voters that at least one of the 
dimensions of gender beliefs will affect identification.  
6.2.1 Party Politics and the Gender Debate 
   Figure 6.1: Distribution of Gender Beliefs by Partisanship 
 

























 Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Each gender belief is a factor score recoded 0-
 1 with the higher value representing the more progressive response.  
 
 
As shown in Figure 1 below, and more thoroughly flushed out in Chapter Two, 
some variation exists between Democrats, Republicans and Independents with regard to 
each dimension of gender beliefs. Democrats prove more progressive on all three 
dimensions and Republicans more traditional with Independents falling in between the 
two parties; additionally, there is also variation across the dimensions, with all three 


















their respective views on motherhood and similarly more progressive in r gard to 
motherhood compared to beliefs about assertive women. Figure 6.1 demonstrates the 
need to isolate the three dimensions of gender beliefs. For instance, members of the 
Republican Party are more progressive when it comes to women’s opportunities than 
members of the Democratic Party are on motherhood and assertive wom n. Figure 6.1 
suggests that Americans do see a difference, albeit small, between the two political 
parties and gender equality, given that members of the Democratic P rty were 
consistently more progressive on all three domains compared to the members of the 
Republican Party. 
 As shown in Figure 6.2 the American public, on average and over time, sees a 
difference between the two political parties when it comes to a woman’s plce in society. 
Perceived difference was at its smallest in 1972, with less than half a point difference, 
and at its peak in 1980, with more than a point and half difference between the parties (on 
a seven point scale). Table 6.1, shown below, shows the average placement of each party 
on the woman’s role scale by strength of party affiliation from 1972-2004. Unfortunately, 
the cumulative ANES only includes a party placement question with the old gender 
equality measure and not with any of the measures used as indicators for the current 
gender dimensions in the 2008 ANES. Nevertheless, while not ideal, the measure is still 











Figure 6.2: Distribution of Party Placement Women’s Role Scale From 1972- 004 
 
Source: Cumulative ANES (sample only contains whites). Women’s Role scale ranges from 0-6 with 6 
representing the more progressive response. Note: Respondents were only asked to place political parties 
on the women’s role scale on years shown above.  
 
Table 6.1: Average Perception of Political Party in Regard to Women’s Role 1970-
2004 By Strength of Party Affiliation 
Source: Cumulative ANES (sample only contains whites). Women’s Role scale ranges from 0-6 with 6 
 representing the more progressive response. Note: Respondents were only asked to place political parties 
 on the women’s role scale on the following years: 1972, 1976,1978,1980,1982,1988,1998,2004. 
 
There are some scholars who would describe the major parties as having taken 
clear, distinct positions on the wide scope of women’s issues (Freeman, 1989, Baer & 
 Average Placement of Democratic 
Party on Women’s Role Scale 
(0-6) 
Average Placement of 
Republican Party on 
Women’s Role Scale (0-6) 
General Population 4.04 3.25 
Democrats 4.03 2.98 
Strong Democrats 4.19 2.86 
Weak/leaning Democrats 3.95 3.04 
Republicans 4.14 3.63 
Strong Republicans 4.25 3.71 
Weak/leaning Republicans 4.08 3.60 




Bosistis, 1988; Costain, 1991 and 1992). But as Sanbonmatsu (2002) points out, these are 
often qualitative studies with little to no empirical support. On the other hand, Kira 
Sanbonmatsu’s Democrats, Republicans and Politics of a Woman’s Place (2002) argues 
that, outside abortion, parties have not taken a clear stance on a majority of gender 
issues—rather both parties, often failing to prioritize gender issues, have moved to the 
middle.21 To support this claim, Sanbonmatsu performs content analysis on the paries’ 
statements, including party platforms, convention speeches, and state of the state and 
state of the union addresses, and finds that the parties have been vague on women’s 
issues. This is important to understand, as Sanbonmatsu herself finds, because there are 
certain gender issues that have the potential “to disrupt the existing cleavage between 
Democrats and Republicans” (p. 62-63). 
Even though Sanbonmatsu’s investigation into the parties’ convention speeches, 
state platforms, state of the state and state of the union addresses wa  thorough and 
clearly demonstrates the parties’ inability to present clear, distinct positions on gender 
issues, it is still possible for voters to see differences between the parties when it comes 
to gender equality. As Green, Palmquist, and Shickler (2002) have demonstrated, party 
affiliation sometimes comes down to which groups are associated wi h which parties. 
While the parties may not have taken clear and distinct policy positions, outside of 
abortion, on gender issues, this chapter contends that parties have ymbolically always 
taken clear and distinct positions on women’s role in society in both the private and 
public sphere.  
                                                
21 Sanbonmatsu, however, notes that though both parties have moved to the middle on gender issues, the 




Based on Layman and Carsey’s (2006) finding that individuals will shift their 
partisanship to meet policy preferences only when an issue is both salient and important 
and when the parties have presented clear and distinct differences and Sanbonmatsu’s 
finding that parties have only presented clear and distinct positions on the issue of 
abortion in terms of gender issues, we should expect that that the only gender belief that 
should affect partisanship is beliefs about motherhood (since Chapter Three tells us that 
beliefs about motherhood does affect abortion attitudes): 
H1: On average, progressive beliefs about motherhood have a statistically 
 significant and positive relationship with identification as a Democrat, all else 
 equal.  
H2: On average, progressive beliefs about motherhood have a statistically 
 significant and inverse relationship with Democratic ratings of the Republican 
 Party and Republican ratings of the Republican Party, all else equal.  
H4: On average, progressive beliefs about motherhood have a statistically 
 significant and positive relationship with Democratic ratings of the Democratic 
 Party and Republican ratings of the Democratic Party, all else equal. 
H3: Neither beliefs about assertive women nor beliefs about women’s 
opportunities have a statistically significant relationship with neither party 
identification nor party ratings, all else equal. 
 
6.3 The Evidence 
 
 I now turn to multivariate regression analysis to test hypotheses 1-3. For 




used for this analysis comes from the 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES).  
The independent variables of interest, the three gender beliefs (views on assertive 
women, motherhood, women’s opportunities)  are captured through factor scores creat d
by the same indicators used in earlier chapters and more thoroughly reviewed in Chapter 
Two (see Chapter Six Appendix or Chapter Two for full details on coding). The factor
scores were re-coded to 0-1 for ease of interpretation with one representing the mos  
progressive position and zero the most traditional.  
 Because other factors have been shown to affect party affiliation, controls were 
included in the model. Controls were divided into two sets: attitudinal/value variables 
that may affect party affiliation and socio-economic variables that may affect 
partisanship. Attitudinal/value variables include: congressional approval ratings, gay 
rights, national security, individualism, social welfare spending, and ideology. Scio-
economic variables include: age, sex, household income, religious traditionalism and 
educational attainment. Finally, a seven point party identification scale, with Democrat 
coded as the higher value and Republican as the minimum value, serves as the dependent 
variable. VIF scores were computed for the model to check for multicollinearity (none of 
which exceed 2) indicating multicollinearity is not a concern. The model presented in this 
chapter utilizes OLS as the statistical tool, however, the model was also run in ordered 
logit and there are no substantive differences in the results. Therefore, for ease of 
interpretation, the OLS model is presented. 


















































 Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with stand rd errors in parentheses. All  
 variables have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive   
 response (if applicable). All factor scores have be n recoded 0-1 for ease of   
 interpretation.  
 
 



































































 The only statistically significant dimension is beliefs about women’s 
opportunities. On average, it has a significant and positive effect on party identification 
(with Democratic affiliation coded as the higher value). A one unit positive change in 
beliefs about women’s opportunities translates in to 1.91 positive shift on the seven point 
party identification. On the one hand, the more progressive an individual is in regard to 
beliefs about women’s opportunities the more likely he or she is going to identify as a 
Democrat. On the other hand, the two other dimensions of feminism, beliefs about 
assertive women and beliefs about motherhood have no relationship with party 
identification. These findings fail to confirm Hypotheses 1&4.  
 The other attitudinal/value variables that are statistically significant in the model 
are ideology, national security, and social welfare spending. The only significant 
demographic variable is household income. On average, higher household income 
decreases the likelihood an individual will identify as a Democrat, all else equal. 
 
6.4 Gender Beliefs and Feelings of Warmth toward the Parties 
 I am also interested in how gender beliefs affect feelings of warmth toward either 
party by both their members and opposing party members. Utilizing the same 2008 
ANES dataset, I investigate this question. To capture feelings of warmth toward each 
party, I use thermometer scores ranging from 0-100, with 100 representing feelings of 
warmth. Since the dependent variable is continuous, OLS is the appropriate statistical 






Table 6.3: Effect of Gender Beliefs on Ratings of Democratic Party by Democrats 
 
Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with stand rd errors in parentheses. All variables 
have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). 




Coefficient with Robust Standard Error 
p-value 



























































































Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with stand rd errors in parentheses. All variables 
have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). 
All factor scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation.  
 
 
Coefficient with Robust Standard Error 
p-value 





































































    Table 6.5: Effect of Gender Beliefs on Ratings of Democratic Party by    





















Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with stand rd errors in parentheses. All variables 
have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). 





Coefficient with Robust Standard Error 
p-value 


























































































Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with stand rd errors in parentheses. All variables 
have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). 
All factor scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation.  
 Coefficient with Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 



































































6.2 also affect feelings of warmth toward the party; therefore, I use the same attitudinal 
and socio-economic controls and run each model for each party’s base (creating an 
inherently interactive model). 
  Interestingly, even though beliefs about assertive women do not affect 
identification, as shown in Table 6.2, they do, however, affect feelings of warmth for the 
opposing party. On average, for Republicans, beliefs about assertive women hav  a 
statistically significant and positive relationship with feelings of warmth toward the 
Democratic Party. When it comes to Democrats, we see an inverse r lationship. On 
average, for Democrats, progressive beliefs about assertive womn have a statistically 
significant and inverse relationship with feelings of warmth for the Republican Party. All 
three dimensions of gender beliefs proved statistically significat with an inverse 
relationship. Progressive beliefs within each dimension lead to lower ratings of the 
Republican Party by members of the Democratic Party. This is a powerful finding—
especially since ideology does not affect Democrats’ feelings toward the Republican 
Party. 
 When it comes to party members’ feeling toward their own party, beliefs about 
women’s opportunities, which do affect party identification for both Republicans and 
Democrats, also affect how Democrats rate their own party. On average, beliefs about 
women’s opportunities have a statistically significant and positive relationship with 
ratings of the Democratic Party by Democrats. For Republicans, none of the gender 
dimensions included in the model affects how they feel toward their own party.  
 Beliefs about motherhood neither affect party identification nor does it affect how 




beliefs about motherhood affect ratings, Democrats with progressive views toward 
motherhood rate Republicans lower on average. These findings fail to confirm 
hypotheses 1-3. It does suggest, however, that for Democrats the issue of abortion is a 
reason to feel negatively toward the Republican Party but not necessarily one to feel 
favorably toward their own party.  
 
6.5 Implications and Conclusion 
 “According to suffrage leader Carrie Chapman Catt, women won the rig t to vote 
despite—not because of—the major parties” (Freeman, 2000 in Sanbonmatsu, 2002, p. 
32). The relationship between the major political parties and women’s advancement has 
played out over the years on both the national stage as well as at st te and local levels. 
The findings presented in this chapter begin to shed light on how American’s feminist 
belief system related their relationships with the two major political parties. 
 The electorate proves to be the most progressive in their beliefs about women’s 
opportunities, which also informs party identification and feelings of warmth Democrats 
form toward their own party. Issues and symbolism that trigger voters’ beliefs about 
women’s opportunities are more long-standing, compared to issues and/or symbolism 
that trigger voters’ beliefs about motherhood or assertive women, and therefore, they 
have built this association with the parties—particularly the Democratic Party over time. 
Additionally, there are more Woman national figures who have championed women’s 
opportunities associated with the Democratic Party (even though the efforts of these 
women may not be reflected by party priorities). These findings are consistent with 




significant predictor of ratings of Hillary Clinton (a contender for the Democratic 
presidential nomination), all else equal.  
 The fact that beliefs about motherhood do not play a major role in party
identification is an interesting and somewhat surprising finding, not only because 
abortion is argued to be the only gender issue that the parties have presented clear and 
distinct positions on, but also because of the importance of motherhood beliefs on 
candidate evaluations (both 2008 evaluations of Sarah Palin and experimental) and on 
abortion attitudes. While the parties have taken clear, distinct positions on abortion (a 
policy preference shown in Chapter Three to be affected by motherhood beliefs), they 
otherwise have not dealt with, either substantively or symbolically, other topics that 
voters might associate with motherhood and the evolving family structure in a major way. 
Consequently, beliefs about motherhood do not play a major role in either party 
identification or feelings of warmth toward either party, generally speaking.  
Beliefs about motherhood come only into play concerning members of the 
Democratic Party’s feelings toward the Republican Party (but not vice versa and not 
toward their own party). One possible explanation for this finding is the amount of 
activity surrounding abortion rights and the Republican Party. In 1973, Roe v. Wade 
confirmed a woman’s right to an abortion during the first trimester (among other things). 
Since that landmark decision, the Republican Party has worked toward appealing that 
decision and regulating it. The Democratic Party need only stand firm in its support of a 
woman’s right to choose, whether they voice their support or work to curb legislation that 
seeks to thwart that right—in other words, simply focus on protecting the status quo. In 




reproductive rights for members of the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party itself 














 This project first began as a seminar paper with the simple goal of measuring the 
extent to which feminist attitudes affected ratings of Hillary Clinton in her 2008 bid for 
the Democratic nomination. My results were robust—anti-feminist attitudes do in fact 
contribute to lower ratings of Hillary Clinton. Ah-ha, I knew it! I was set to present my 
results and my case that, in fact, the American electorate was simply not ready to put a 
woman in the White House (particularly within socially conservative groups), that 
Clinton has been the victim of discrimination, and that anti-feminism had reared its ugly 
head into an American election. And then a funny thing happened. Those anti-feminist 
social conservatives began to rally around a female nominee for Vice President, Sarah 
Palin. Not only did they support her, Palin was quickly becoming the darling of the right. 
How is it, I found myself wondering, that individuals whose antifeminist beliefs 
contribute to their strong resentment of one Clinton, rate Palin so highly? Could it be she 
just represents anti-feminist values? If so, how do we reconcile that with the fac  she is 
asking supporters to do a very non anti-feminist thing and place her in one of the most 
powerful positions in the country. 
 I then began to examine my operationalization of “feminist beliefs” and began to 
pay attention to how everyone seemed to think and talk about women and gender norms.  




positions on women’s issues and as I more heavily dove into the literature on public 
opinion and gender attitudes I also quickly realized the wide array of inconsistencie . My 
seminar paper than evolved into a much larger project asking a very important, but ye 
unanswered question: how do American voters think about gender?   
 The most important take away from this dissertation is that an individual’s gender 
belief system is multi-dimensional and, at the very least, there are three distinct 
dimensions with differing predictive power. Why is this important? For several reasons:  
1) Consistency: Future work that hopes to include measures of gender 
 attitudes should theoretically justify their use of a measure and present and 
 digest the results keeping in mind that their indicator(s) may only be 
 representative of one or two dimensions. As demonstrated in Chapter 
 Four, had I been un-aware that the feminist belief system is multi-
 dimensional and used a single measure dealing with women’s 
 discrimination or equality I would have incorrectly concluded that gender 
 attitudes in no way, good or bad, affect ratings of Palin. Hopefully, this 
 will contribute to consistency within the sub-field when it comes to the 
 role of feminist attitudes in political choices and evaluations.  
2)  Understanding: Isolating each gender belief allows for political scientists 
 to develop a more thorough understanding of each dimension and its 
 relationship with political phenomena. For instance, we learn in Chapter 
 Five women with small children who run for public office are not 
 penalized by traditional views on motherhood as one might have 




 (i.e. childless women) and run for office are seen as threat by 
 individuals with traditional views on motherhood. Isolating each gender 
 belief allows political scientists to develop a much deeper understanding 
 of each dimension on its own. 
3) Accuracy: Accounting for and isolating each dimension of gender beliefs 
 is critical in painting an accurate picture of the American electorate and 
 feminism. As noted earlier in the dissertation, the feminist/antifeminist 
 dichotomy is no longer a useful way to conceptualize the American public 
 and relationship with  feminism. Once we account for each dimension we 
 can develop a clearer picture  of different demographic groups and where 
 they stand in relation to feminism. For example, it would be 
 incorrect to say that younger cohorts are more feminist. As  seen in 
 Chapter Two,  while younger cohorts are more progressive when it comes 
 to views on assertive women and beliefs about motherhood, older cohorts 
 are more progressive when it comes to women’s opportunities.  
 
As I’ve noted in the introduction, I make the case that the feminist belief systm i  multi-
dimensional and that there are at least three distinct dimensions dealing with women’s 
opportunities, motherhood, and assertive women. As my research progressed, I began to 
realize that there may be a fourth dimension dealing with women’s sexual liberty that 
also affects political choices. Unfortunately, this dissertation heavily rel es on existing 
public data and there are not sufficient measures publicly available to appropriately 




in future work. Again, as noted in the introduction, gender beliefs among African 
Americans and Hispanics is an important research question still left unanswered. This, as 
well, is a project I hope to pursue using this dissertation as a foundation in the future. 
      As the campaign world gets ready to head into the 2012 general election cycle, issues 
surrounding women have taken center stage.  Many interest groups and media outlets 
tagging the recent events surrounding women’s issue, such as the debate over 
contraception, Sandra Fluke’s testimony, mandated ultrasounds before abortions, and the 
Komen and Planned Parenthood debacle as the “war on women.” What does this mean 
exactly for upcoming election? The findings in this dissertation will better quip political 
scientists as they being to understand and tackle the many questions and nuances 




























  Appendices 
Chapter Two Appendix 
 
Measurement of Gender Beliefs       
*All variables were coded so that the most progressive responses have the highest value* 
 
Belief about Women’s Opportunities   
 
Women often miss out on good jobs because 
of discrimination. 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE 
SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or 
DISAGREE STRONGLY with this 
statement?) 
 
Do you personally hope that the United 
States has a woman President in your 
lifetime, do you hope the United States does 
not have a woman President in your lifetime, 
or do you not hope either way? 
 
Motherhood& Family Structure  
  
 It is much better for everyone involved if the 
man is the achiever outside the home and the 
woman takes care of the home and family.' 
(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this 
statement?) 
 
 A working mother can establish just as 
warm and secure a relationship with her 
children as a mother who does not work.' 
(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this 
statement?) 
    
This country would have many fewer 
problems if there were more emphasis on 
traditional family ties. 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE 
SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR 








Beliefs about Assertive Women            Women who complain about equality are  
      really seeking special favors. 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE 
SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or 




Women who complain about sexual 
harassment are   causing more problems. 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE 
SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or 








Age    Actual value 
 
Woman   1- Woman, 0-Male 
 
South    1- South, 0- Not South 
 
 Income    1. A. None or less than $2,999 210  
 2. B. $3,000 -$4,999  
 3. C. $5,000 -$7,499  
 4. D. $7,500 -$9,999  
 5. E. $10,000 -$10,999  
 6. F. $11,000-$12,499  
 7. G. $12,500-$14,999  
 8. H. $15,000-$16,999  
 9. J. $17,000-$19,999  
 10. K. $20,000-$21,999  
 11. M. $22,000-$24,999  
 12. N. $25,000-$29,999  
 13. P. $30,000-$34,999  




 15. R. $40,000-$44,999  
 16. S. $45,000-$49,999  
 17. T. $50,000-$59,999  
 18. U. $60,000-$74,999  
 19. V. $75,000-$89,999  
 20. W. $90,000-$99,999  
 21. X. $100,000-$109,999  
 22. Y. $110,000-$119,999  
 23. Z. $120,000-$134,999  
 24. AA. $135,000-$149,999  
 25. BB. $150,000 and over 
 
Education 0-no high school, 1- high school graduate, 2- some college/no 




Egalitarian   Society should make sure everyone has equal  
  opportunity. 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE 
SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or 
DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
    
We'd be better off if worried less about equality. 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE 
SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or 
DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
Limited Government   The less government, the better or there are more  
     things that government should be doing? 
 (1. The less government the better 2. More things 
government should be doing) 
  
The main reason government has become bigger 
over the years is because it has gotten involved in 
things that people should do for themselves; OR 
government has become bigger because the 
problems we face have become bigger. 
(1. Gov't bigger because it's involved in things 
people should handle Themselves 2. Gov't bigger 
because problems bigger) 
 
Moral Traditionalism The world is always changing and we should adjust 




(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE 
SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or 
DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
We should be more tolerant of people who choose 
to live according to their own moral standards, even 
if they are very different from our own. 
 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE 
SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR 
DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or 
DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
PERSONALITY TRAITS 
Authoritarianism Please tell me which one you think is more 
important for a child to have: independence or 
respect for elders. 
 
(0-Independence 1-Both 2-Respect for elders) 
 
Please tell me which one you think is more 
important for 
a child to have: CURIOSITY or GOOD 
MANNERS 
(0-Curiosity 1-Both 2-Good Manners) 
 
Please tell me which one you think is more 
important for 
a child to have: OBEDIENCE or SELF-RELIANCE 
(0-Obedience 1-Both 2-Self-reliance) 
 
Please tell me which one you think is more 
important for a child to have: BEING 
CONSIDERATE or WELL BEHAVED 
 
(0-Being considerate 1-Both 2-Well behaved) 
 
Religious traditionalism  Index score 
*coded so the higher value represents higher levels of traditionalism.  
   
Would you say your religion provides SOME 
guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT 
of guidance, or a GREAT DEAL of guidance in 





People practice their religion in different ways. 
Outside of attending religious services, do you 
pray SEVERAL TIMES A DAY, ONCE A DAY, 
A FEW TIMES A WEEK, ONCE A WEEK OR 
LESS, or NEVER? 
 
Do you go to religious services EVERY WEEK, 
ALMOST EVERY WEEK,ONCE OR TWICE A 
MONTH, A FEW TIMES A YEAR, or NEVER? 
 

















































































Belief about Assertive Women Factor Score
 
 




 Chapter Three Appendix 
 






Attitudinal Bases for Abortion Attitudes 
Belief About 
Motherhood 
.450 .144 .002 
Religious Traditionalism -.512 .099 .000 
Ideology .337 .187 .007 
Beliefs About Women’s 
Opportunities 
.114 .131 .382 
Views on Assertive 
Women 
.116 .129 .368 
Individualism .235 .286 .410 
Social Bases for Abortion Attitudes 
Education .378 .088 .000 
Age .015 .008 .000 
Party Identification .166 .078 .033 
Household Income -.008 .027 .769 
Residency in the South .247 .244 .311 
Sex .258 .262 .324 
                                                                                                                                           
N=382 
R2=.150 
     Source: 2008 ANES. Note: coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables have    
      been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All    











Attitudinal Bases for Abortion Attitudes 
Belief About 
Motherhood 
.516 .151 .001 
Religious 
Traditionalism 
-.492 .100 .000 




.044 .135 .740 
Views on Assertive 
Women 
.135 .139 .332 
Individualism .234 .297 .431 
Social Bases for Abortion Attitudes 
Education .356 .097 .000 
Age .015 .008 .000 
Party Identification .176 .079 .027 
Household Income -.012 .029 .667 
Residency in the South .325 .262 .214 
Sex .287 .273 .295 
                                                                                                                             
N=382                                                                                                                           
R2=.150 
    Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with s andard errors in parentheses. All variables   
     have been  coded so that the highest value repr s nts the progressive response (if applicable).     






Coding Details         




Gender Beliefs:  
Women’s Opportunities: Factor score made up of the following questions: 
 
    Women often miss out on good jobs  
    because of discrimination. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
    Do you personally hope that the United States has a  
    woman President in your lifetime, do you hope the  
    United States does not have a woman President in  
    your lifetime, or do you not hope either way? 
 
 Motherhood:     Factor score made up of the following questions: 
 
    It is much better for everyone involved if the man is 
    the achiever outside the home and the woman takes  
    care of the home and family. 
 
    (Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?) 
 
     A working mother can establish just as warm and  
    secure a relationship with her children as a mother  
    who does not work. 
 
    (Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?) 
    





    This country would have many fewer problems if  
    there were more emphasis on traditional family ties. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
Views on Assertive Women: Factor score made up of the following questions: 
 
    Women who complain about equality are really  
    seeking special favors. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement? 
 
    Women who complain about sexual harassment are  
    causing more  problems. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
Measurement of Demographics:       
  
Age    Actual value 
 
Sex    1- Woman, 0-Male 
 
South    1- South, 0- Not South 
 
Income    1. A. None or less than $2,999 210  
 2. B. $3,000 -$4,999  
 3. C. $5,000 -$7,499  
 4. D. $7,500 -$9,999  




 6. F. $11,000-$12,499  
 7. G. $12,500-$14,999  
 8. H. $15,000-$16,999  
 9. J. $17,000-$19,999  
 10. K. $20,000-$21,999  
 11. M. $22,000-$24,999  
 12. N. $25,000-$29,999  
 13. P. $30,000-$34,999  
 14. Q. $35,000-$39,999  
 15. R. $40,000-$44,999  
 16. S. $45,000-$49,999  
 17. T. $50,000-$59,999  
 18. U. $60,000-$74,999  
 19. V. $75,000-$89,999  
 20. W. $90,000-$99,999  
 21. X. $100,000-$109,999  
 22. Y. $110,000-$119,999  
 23. Z. $120,000-$134,999  
 24. AA. $135,000-$149,999  
 25. BB. $150,000 and over 
 
 Education   0-no high school, 1- high school graduate, 2- some  
    college/no degree, 3- AA degree, 4- BA, 5-MA, 6- 
    MA and Higher  
 
Ideology   0- Extremely Conservative, 1- Conservative, 2-  
    Slightly Conservative, 3-Moderate (Middle of the  
    Road) & “I haven’t thought too much about it”, 4-  
    Slightly Liberal, 5- Liberal, 6- Extremely Liberal 
 
Party Identification  0- Republican, 1-Independent, 2-Democrat 
 
Religious Traditionalism Index score ranging from 0-4 made up of the 
following measures: 
 
   People practice their religion in different ways.  
    Outside of attending religious services, do you pray  
    SEVERAL TIMES A DAY,ONCE A DAY, A  
    FEW TIMES A WEEK, ONCE A WEEK OR  





    Would you say your religion provides SOME  
    guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT  
    of guidance, or a GREAT DEAL of guidance in  
    your day-to-day life? 
 
   Lots of things come up that keep people from  
    attending religious services even if they want to.  
    Thinking about your life these days, do you ever  
    attend religious services, apart from occasional  
    weddings, baptisms or funerals? 
 
Individualism   Next, I am going to ask you to choose which of two 
   statements I read comes closer to your own opinion. 
   You might agree to some extent with both, but we  
    want to know which one is closer to your own  
    views…. 
 
0- there are more things that government should 
be doing, 





























Chapter Four Appendix 
Coding Details         




Gender Beliefs:  
Women’s Opportunities: Factor score made up of the following questions: 
 
    Women often miss out on good jobs  
    because of discrimination. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
    Do you personally hope that the United States has a  
    woman President in your lifetime, do you hope the  
    United States does not have a woman President in  
    your lifetime, or do you not hope either way? 
 
 Motherhood:     Factor score made up of the following questions: 
 
    It is much better for everyone involved if the man is 
    the achiever outside the home and the woman takes  
    care of the home and family. 
 
    (Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?) 
 
     A working mother can establish just as warm and  
    secure a relationship with her children as a mother  
    who does not work. 
 
    (Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?) 




     
 
    This country would have many fewer problems if  
    there were more emphasis on traditional family ties. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
Views on Assertive Women: Factor score made up of the following questions: 
 
    Women who complain about equality are really  
    seeking special favors. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement? 
 
    Women who complain about sexual harassment are  
    causing more  problems. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
Measurement of Demographics:         
DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Age  Actual value 
 
Sex  1- Woman, 0-Male 
 
South  1- South, 0- Not South 
 
Income  1. A. None or less than $2,999 210 
  2. B. $3,000 -$4,999 
 3. C. $5,000 -$7,499 
 4. D. $7,500 -$9,999 




 6. F. $11,000-$12,499 
 7. G. $12,500-$14,999 
 8. H. $15,000-$16,999 
 9. J. $17,000-$19,999 
 10. K. $20,000-$21,999 
 11. M. $22,000-$24,999 
 12. N. $25,000-$29,999 
 13. P. $30,000-$34,999 
 14. Q. $35,000-$39,999 
 15. R. $40,000-$44,999 
 16. S. $45,000-$49,999 
 17. T. $50,000-$59,999 
 18. U. $60,000-$74,999 
 19. V. $75,000-$89,999 
 20. W. $90,000-$99,999 
 21. X. $100,000-$109,999 
 22. Y. $110,000-$119,999 
 23. Z. $120,000-$134,999 
 24. AA. $135,000-$149,999 
 25. BB. $150,000 and over 
 
Education  0-no high school,1- high school graduate, 2- some  
   college/no degree, 3- AA degree, 4- BA, 5-MA, 6-MA and  
   Higher  
 
Ideology  0- Extremely Conservative, 1- Conservative, 2- Slightly 
  Conservative, 3-Moderate (Middle of the Road) & “I  
  haven’t thought too much about it”, 4- Slightly Liberal, 5-  
  Liberal, 6-Extremely Liberal 
 
Party Identification  0- Republican, 1-Independent, 2-Democrat 
 
Religious Traditionalism Index Score (coded so the higher value represents higher 
 levels of traditionalism.) 
 
 Would you say your religion provides SOME guidance in 
 your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT of guidance, or a 
 GREAT DEAL of guidance in your day-to-day life? 
 
 People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of 
 attending religious services, do you pray SEVERAL 
 TIMES A DAY, ONCE A DAY, A FEW TIMES A  
 WEEK, ONCE A WEEK OR LESS, or NEVER? 
 




 EVERY WEEK,ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH, A FEW
 TIMES A YEAR, or NEVER? 
 
 
Individualism The less government, the better or there are more things that 
 government should be doing? 
 0-More things  government should be doing 1- The  less 
 government the better   
 
Retrospective economic  Now thinking about the economy in the country as a 
 Evaluations whole, would you say that over the past year 
 the nation's economy has gotten 
 








































Gender Belief Measurements:         
Women’s Opportunities: Factor score made up of the following questions: 
 
    Women often miss out on good jobs  
    because of discrimination. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
    Do you personally hope that the United States has a  
    woman President in your lifetime, do you hope the  
    United States does not have a woman President in  
    your lifetime, or do you not hope either way? 
 
 Motherhood:     Factor score made up of the following questions: 
 
    It is much better for everyone involved if the man is 
    the achiever outside the home and the woman takes  
    care of the home and family. 
 
    (Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?) 
 
     A working mother can establish just as warm and  
    secure a relationship with her children as a mother  
    who does not work. 
 
    (Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?) 
    
     
 
    This country would have many fewer problems if  





    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
Views on Assertive Women: Factor score made up of the following questions: 
 
    Women who complain about equality are really  
    seeking special favors. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement? 
 
    Women who complain about sexual harassment are  
    causing more  problems. 
 
    (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE   
    SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR   
    DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or  
    DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?) 
 
Primary Independent Variable:        
 
Beliefs about Motherhood Index Score: 
*Higher value represents most progressive response 
 
     A working mother can establish just as warm and  
     secure a relationship with her children as a mother  
     who does not  work.' 
 
 0-Disagree, 1-Niether Agree or Disagree, 2-agree 
    
                 This country would have many fewer problems if  
     there were more emphasis on traditional family ties. 
 









Independent Variables         
 
Race    White 1, other 0 
 
Age    actual value 
 
Party ID  0- Strong Republican, 1- Republican, 2-Leaning 
 Republican 3-Independent, 4- leaning Democrat, 5-
 Democrat, 6- Strong Democrat 
 
Ideology  0- Extremely Conservative, 1- Conservative, 2- 
 Slightly Conservative, 3-Moderate (Middle of the 
 Road), 4- Slightly Liberal, 5- Liberal, 6- Extremely 
 Liberal 
 
Woman   1- Woman, 0-Male 
 
Household Income   1. A. None or less than $2,999 210  
 2. B. $3,000 -$4,999  
 3. C. $5,000 -$7,499  
 4. D. $7,500 -$9,999  
 5. E. $10,000 -$10,999  
 6. F. $11,000-$12,499  
 7. G. $12,500-$14,999  
 8. H. $15,000-$16,999  
 9. J. $17,000-$19,999  
 10. K. $20,000-$21,999  
 11. M. $22,000-$24,999  
 12. N. $25,000-$29,999  
 13. P. $30,000-$34,999  
14. Q. $35,000-$39,999  
15. R. $40,000-$44,999  
16. S. $45,000-$49,999  
17. T. $50,000-$59,999  
18. U. $60,000-$74,999  
19. V. $75,000-$89,999  
20. W. $90,000-$99,999  
21. X. $100,000-$109,999  
 22. Y. $110,000-$119,999  
23. Z. $120,000-$134,999  
24. AA. $135,000-$149,999  









Religious Traditionalism  Index Score: 
   
People practice their religion in different ways. 
Outside of attending religious services, how often 
do you pray? 
 
0-Never, 1-Seldom, 2-A few times a month, 3-Once 
a week, 4-A few times a week, 5-A few times a 
month, 6-Once a week, 7- Once a day, 8- Several 
times a day 
 
How important is religion in your life? 
 
0-Not at all important, 1-Not too important, 2-
Somwhat important, 3-Very important 
 
Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do 
you attend religious services? 
 
0-Never, 1-Seldom, 2-A few times a month, 3-Once 
a week, 4-A few times a week, 5-A few times a 
month, 6-Once a week, 7- more than once a week 
 
 
Education  0-no high school, 1- high school graduate, 2- some 
 college/no degree, 3- AA degree, 4- BA, 5-MA, 6-






















Chapter Six Appendix 
  
 
*All variables were coded so that the most progressive responses have the highest value* 
 
Gender Beliefs:            
Women’s Opportunities: 
Women often miss out on good jobs because of 
discrimination. 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, 
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE 
SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this 
statement?) 
 
Do you personally hope that the United States has a woman 
President in your lifetime, do you hope the United States 
does not have a woman President in your lifetime, or do 
you not hope either way? 
 
Family Structure & Motherhood: 
 
 It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the 
achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the 
home and family.' 
(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or 
DISAGREE with this statement?) 
 
    A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a  
relationship with her children as a mother who does not 
work.' 
(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or 
DISAGREE with this statement?) 
 
This country would have many fewer problems if there 
were more emphasis on traditional family ties. 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, 
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE 




Views on Assertive Women:  
Women who complain about equality are really seeking 
special favors. 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, 




SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this 
statement? 
 
Women who complain about sexual harassment are causing 
more  problems. 
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, 
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE 
SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this 
statement?) 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS           
  
 Age    Actual value 
 
 Sex    1- Woman, 0-Male 
 
 South    1- South, 0- Not South 
 
 Household Income  1. A. None or less than $2,999 210  
2. B. $3,000 -$4,999  
3. C. $5,000 -$7,499  
4. D. $7,500 -$9,999  
5. E. $10,000 -$10,999  
6. F. $11,000-$12,499  
7. G. $12,500-$14,999  
8. H. $15,000-$16,999  
9. J. $17,000-$19,999  
10. K. $20,000-$21,999  
11. M. $22,000-$24,999  
12. N. $25,000-$29,999  
13. P. $30,000-$34,999  
14. Q. $35,000-$39,999  
15. R. $40,000-$44,999  
16. S. $45,000-$49,999  
17. T. $50,000-$59,999  
18. U. $60,000-$74,999  
19. V. $75,000-$89,999  
20. W. $90,000-$99,999  
21. X. $100,000-$109,999  
22. Y. $110,000-$119,999  
23. Z. $120,000-$134,999  
24. AA. $135,000-$149,999  





 Education 0-no high school, 1- high school graduate, 2- some 
college/no degree, 3- AA degree, 4- BA, 5-MA, 6-
MA and Higher  
 
 Party Identification  0- Strongly Republican, 1-weak republican, 2- 
     independent-republican, 3independent-  
     independent,4-independent-Democrat 5-weak  
     Democrat, 6-Strong Democrat 
 
Religious Traditionalism Index Score (coded so the higher value represents 
higher levels of traditionalism.) 
 
Would you say your religion provides SOME 
guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT 
of guidance, or a GREAT DEAL of guidance in 
your day-to-day life? 
 
People practice their religion in different ways. 
Outside of attending religious services, do you pray 
SEVERAL TIMES A DAY, ONCE A DAY, A 
FEW TIMES A WEEK, ONCE A WEEK OR 
LESS, or NEVER? 
 
Do you go to religious services EVERY WEEK, 
ALMOST EVERY WEEK,ONCE OR TWICE A 
MONTH, A FEW TIMES A YEAR, or NEVER? 
 
 ATTITUDES/VALUES         
 
 Individualism The less government, the better or there are more 
things that government should be doing? 
0-More things  government should be doing 
1-The less government the better 
 
 
Ideology 0- Extremely Conservative, 1- Conservative, 2- 
Slightly Conservative, 3-Moderate (Middle of the 
Road) & “I haven’t thought too much about it”, 4- 
Slightly Liberal, 5- Liberal, 6- Extremely Liberal 
 
Congressional Approval Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress 
is handling its job? 
 
 0-Srongly disapprove, 1-somewhat disapprove, 2-





Gay Rights Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to 
serve in the United States Armed Services or don’t 
you think so? 
 
0-Strongly should not be allowed to serve, 1-
somewhat strongly should not be allowed to serve, 
2-somewhat strongly should be allowed to serve, 
3-strongly should be allowed to serve 
 
Social Welfare Spending Should federal spending on welfare programs be 
increased, decreased or kept the same? 
 
 0-Decreased, 1- kept the same, 2- Increased 
 
National Defense Do you think the government should spend more 
on national defense, less on national defense, or 
about the same on national defense it does now? 
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